Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic indicative of VelvetCake malware exfiltrating data. The rule specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests to 'logout.php' containing 'OKey' and 'Who' parameters, using a user agent string that includes 'WebClient', which is often associated with PowerShell-based network requests.
Detects two-stage network activity associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits. The first part detects the submission of stolen credentials or session data to a local WebDAV panel (xwps.php), and the second part detects the subsequent exfiltration of that captured data to the Telegram Bot API.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header indicates a PowerShell execution occurring from a system configured with the zh-CN locale. This pattern is often associated with automated scripts or potential malicious activity masquerading as legitimate PowerShell traffic.
Detection of common web server reconnaissance, enumeration, and brute-force patterns targeting IIS environments. This includes detection of short-name (~1) probes, WebDAV method usage, NTFS alternate data stream requests, and brute-force attempts on login endpoints originating from PowerShell user agents.
Detects two-stage communication pattern used by the Lorem Ipsum Loader. The first stage involves a GET request to a specific host acting as a dead-drop resolver to retrieve configuration. The second stage involves a POST request to an external destination containing a JPEG file header, characteristic of image-based C2 traffic.
Detects a sequence of network events where a host downloads a portable Python embeddable package from python.org, followed by a subsequent attempt to establish a WebSocket connection. This pattern is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity using a Python-based tunnel.
Detects outbound HTTP requests from endpoints to a known C2 infrastructure associated with mobile device spyware. The rule identifies two specific stages: polling for new commands using a GET request and posting command execution results using a POST request, both targeting an MDM-mimicking API structure.
Detects an Android device registration attempt to a known malicious C2 IP address using parameters characteristic of a mobile device management (MDM) implant. The rule looks for a POST request to a specific registration endpoint containing device identifiers like deviceId, manufacturer, model, and osVersion.
Detects HTTP GET requests targeting the Vite Dev Server that include directory traversal sequences ('../') within the '/@fs/' endpoint. This pattern is indicative of an attempt to bypass root directory restrictions to access sensitive files on the server.
Detects repeated attempts to enumerate available model endpoints on a LiteLLM server, a behavior often associated with reconnaissance targeting AI gateway services to identify exposed models.
Detects anomalous POST requests to Citrix NetScaler SAML authentication endpoints (/saml/login or /cgi/samlauth) that result in an HTTP 500 error, which may indicate a heap overflow exploitation attempt associated with CVE-2026-8452.
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