Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP POST requests directed at common LLM API endpoints (chat completions, model beta) that contain patterns indicative of LLM prompt injection or malicious code generation requests, such as commands for code obfuscation or payload regeneration, specifically where the User-Agent does not match standard browser strings and the request body contains base64 encoded instructions.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests from mobile user agents (Android, Dalvik, okhttp) that contain keywords indicative of contactless payment card data exfiltration, specifically looking for fields such as 'track2', 'pan', 'atc', and 'cryptogram'. This behavior is consistent with malicious mobile applications attempting to transmit skimmed NFC credit card data to an external server.
Detects outbound HTTP PUT requests characteristic of data exfiltration associated with Qilin ransomware. The rule monitors for the use of command-line tools like s5cmd or rclone for uploading data, often used during the double extortion phase where stolen data is uploaded to leak sites.
Detects repetitive network traffic to the Slack API endpoint '/api/conversations.history' using the 'Go-http-client' User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of the Graphalgo RAT polling Slack for command-and-control (C2) instructions.
Detects HTTP traffic identified as Sauron Loader, characterized by specific POST requests to hardcoded domains, URI path structures, and user-agent strings indicative of automated C2 activity.
Detects HTTP traffic identified as Sauron Loader, characterized by specific POST requests to hardcoded domains, URI path structures, and user-agent strings indicative of automated C2 activity.
Detects a multi-stage network communication pattern characteristic of agent sandbox evasion and subsequent data exfiltration. The rule first identifies an unusual volume of connections to URL-shorteners using encoded fragments in the URI, and subsequently flags calls to common screenshot or rendering services containing 'url=' parameters, suggesting possible pixel-based data exfiltration over a command and control channel.
Detects network activity, including HTTP requests and TLS SNI traffic, directed towards the known GRIMWEDGE C2 domain 'ocr.opusaccel.top'. This includes monitoring for repeated polling behavior indicative of a command and control heartbeat mechanism.
Detects a network request to download a file named 'msgbox.exe' using the curl command-line utility, consistent with the activity observed from threat actor UTA0560 (GRIMWEDGE). This rule monitors for HTTP GET requests targeting the specific file path while the User-Agent string begins with 'curl/'.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests containing suspicious URL query parameters (nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure or chave_tecl_cresol) that are associated with phishing kits targeting Brazilian taxpayers, often used to deliver or facilitate HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) remote access tools.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests containing an 'auth=' parameter with a long string of alphanumeric characters, characteristic of an OAuth token exfiltration attempt by a malicious Twitch extension (JeetBot). The rule flags requests to external destinations that are not official Twitch, Twitch Video Network, or JTV domains.
Detects network traffic associated with the WallStealer malware, including the download of malicious payloads from a known C2 server, communication with a cryptominer C2, and the use of Steam Community profiles as dead-drop resolvers for C2 instructions.
Detects network traffic associated with the RatHat Android RAT, specifically monitoring for HTTP and TLS connections to the command and control (C2) delivery domain 'kingbss.com', as well as detecting characteristic FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) client login handshake patterns used for tunnel establishment.
This rule detects potential NTLM relay or authentication downgrade attempts by monitoring HTTP POST requests to the Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) endpoint. It specifically flags when an 'Authorization' header contains an NTLM-wrapped 'Negotiate' token, which is often indicative of an attacker attempting to coerce or relay authentication material to the service.
Detects malicious network activity associated with TokenGrabber stealer malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP requests to public IP lookup services (api.ipify.org) followed by chained geolocation lookups (ip-api.com). This behavior is characteristic of an initial reconnaissance phase where the malware determines the victim's external network footprint.
Detects malicious network activity associated with TokenGrabber stealer malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP requests to public IP lookup services (api.ipify.org) followed by chained geolocation lookups (ip-api.com). This behavior is characteristic of an initial reconnaissance phase where the malware determines the victim's external network footprint.
Detects HTTP responses containing SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware delivery signatures. The rule monitors for a 200 HTTP status code, a content type of 'javascript', and the presence of the specific string 'NDSW' in the response body, which is a known indicator of the SocGholish JavaScript-based loader.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known blockchain RPC endpoints (bsc-dataseed and rpc.ankr.com) that utilize the 'eth_call' method. This behavior is associated with the ClearFake malware strain using the EtherHiding technique, where malicious scripts or payloads are hidden or retrieved via blockchain smart contracts.
This rule monitors HTTP traffic for requests containing 'bp.dat', which is associated with the registration phase of the Latrodectus malware downloader. It detects both URI-based and request body-based attempts by an infected host to register with a command and control server.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the SocGholish Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The rule identifies an HTTP 302 redirect response where the 'Location' header points to a URL containing 'update' and a .js extension, a characteristic behavioral signature used by SocGholish for its drive-by-download campaigns.
Detects outbound network traffic containing the hardcoded user-agent string 'Remcos', which is indicative of a Remcos RAT beacon communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule inspects HTTP requests to identify this specific malware signature within the established communication flow.
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