Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP requests that contain duplicate 'Content-Length' headers, a technique used to perform HTTP Request Smuggling attacks. Attackers exploit discrepancies in how front-end and back-end servers interpret duplicate or conflicting request headers to smuggle requests, bypass security controls, or gain unauthorized access to back-end systems.
Detects repeated suspicious network requests, including non-standard HTTP methods and URI structures, as well as TLS SNI anomalies, targeting the internal sales portal 'agent.3bb.co.th'. The rule triggers when a threshold of 20 requests within a 60-second window is reached from a single source, indicating likely automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning activity.
Detects repeated suspicious network requests, including non-standard HTTP methods and URI structures, as well as TLS SNI anomalies, targeting the internal sales portal 'agent.3bb.co.th'. The rule triggers when a threshold of 20 requests within a 60-second window is reached from a single source, indicating likely automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning activity.
Detects repeated suspicious network requests, including non-standard HTTP methods and URI structures, as well as TLS SNI anomalies, targeting the internal sales portal 'agent.3bb.co.th'. The rule triggers when a threshold of 20 requests within a 60-second window is reached from a single source, indicating likely automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning activity.
Detects HTTP POST requests to a Gitea repository's diffpatch API endpoint whose body contains both a real git diff header and the malicious 'hooks/post-index-change' file path used by the CVE-2026-60004 exploit chain to plant an executable Git hook via an add/add merge collision.
Detects repeated manual HTTP GET requests from many distinct source IPs to a canary token resource. The URI pattern follows a format indicative of a tracked canary token resource, and the threshold of 49 unique source IPs accessing the resource within a prolonged period suggests potential unauthorized reconnaissance or probing activities.
Detects HTTP responses containing JavaScript-based anti-bot challenge patterns commonly used by phishing kits to identify and block automated crawlers, security scanners, and headless browsers.
Detects HTTP response body content indicating the activation of a FlashProxy residential proxy by the GhostCode C2 harvester, based on geoip API responses.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with C2 infrastructure challenges, specifically looking for anti-bot/anti-scanner responses containing specific JavaScript variables ('badAgents', 'js_enabled=1') and subsequent client-side validation requests containing a specific token structure and 'check=1' parameter.
This rule detects potential BabylonRAT C2 beaconing activity by monitoring for recurring outbound HTTP GET requests using a 'Firefox' User-Agent string on non-standard HTTP ports. The threshold mechanism specifically flags repeated connections within a short time frame, which is characteristic of malware beaconing behavior.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects outbound WebSocket upgrade requests from internal network assets to known IronToll C2 IP addresses, restricted to requests whose Host header ends in one of the disposable TLDs observed across the campaign's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .shop, .icu, .buzz, etc). This narrows the alert to the campaign's actual phishing-domain pattern rather than any WebSocket traffic that happens to reach the same shared Tencent/Alibaba cloud IPs, and a per-source threshold caps repeat alerts from the same host to one per hour.
Detects outbound WebSocket upgrade requests from internal network assets to known IronToll C2 IP addresses, restricted to requests whose Host header ends in one of the disposable TLDs observed across the campaign's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .shop, .icu, .buzz, etc). This narrows the alert to the campaign's actual phishing-domain pattern rather than any WebSocket traffic that happens to reach the same shared Tencent/Alibaba cloud IPs, and a per-source threshold caps repeat alerts from the same host to one per hour.
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