Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to grep for passwords within the bash history file over an SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for the string 'grep -i password ~/.bash_history' in TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH). This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover credentials on a compromised system.
This rule detects potential SMB Relay attacks attempting to capture NTLM hashes. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) directed to the home network, where the flow is established and contains both "NTLMSSP" and "NTLMSSP_AUTH" content. A threshold of 3 occurrences within 30 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects a brute-force attack against a POP3 email account. It triggers when 20 or more TCP connections are made to port 995 (POP3S) on the HOME_NET within a 30-second window from the same source IP address. This pattern is indicative of an attacker repeatedly attempting to guess credentials.
This rule detects attempts to create a setuid binary on a remote host via an SSH connection. It specifically looks for the string "chmod u+s" within TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH), indicating a command to set the setuid bit on a file. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation attempts where an attacker tries to create a backdoor or maintain persistence with elevated privileges.
This rule detects network traffic that contains specific strings indicative of a Systemd service unit being created for persistence. Specifically, it looks for the string "/etc/systemd/system" and ".service" within TCP traffic directed to the home network on port 22 (SSH). This combination suggests an attempt to establish persistence on a Linux system by creating a new Systemd service.
This rule detects remote modification attempts of the 'Run' key within the Windows Registry, which is commonly used for persistence by malware and legitimate applications to automatically start programs when a user logs in. The detection specifically looks for network traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the string 'CurrentVersion\Run', indicating an attempt to interact with this registry path remotely.
This rule detects the string "systemctl enable" within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH). This indicates an attempt to enable a systemd service on a remote Linux host via an established SSH connection. This activity could be part of legitimate system administration but also could be indicative of an attacker persisting a malicious service.
This rule detects multiple WinRM authentication attempts using basic authentication from a single source IP address to the local network. It specifically looks for the 'Authorization: Basic' header in TCP traffic destined for port 5985 (default WinRM port) and triggers an alert if five such attempts occur within 30 seconds from the same source.
This rule detects attempts to log in to a Telnet server using the default credential 'admin'. It specifically looks for the string 'admin' in TCP traffic directed to the HOME_NET on port 23 (Telnet). A threshold of 3 attempts within 30 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a potential brute-force or default credential attack.
This rule detects suspicious file drops over SMB (port 445) that contain both ".lnk" (likely a shortcut file) and "System32" in their content. This combination is often indicative of malware attempting to spread via removable media, using shortcut files to execute malicious payloads, potentially mimicking legitimate system directories.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections on port 9050, which is commonly used by the Tor anonymity network. The rule is configured to trigger an alert if there are at least 3 such connections from the same source within a 60-second window, indicating potential use of Tor. The message suggests this activity is related to accessing an Initial Access Broker market.
This rule detects a TCP SYN packet (initial connection attempt) directed towards port 10443 on the home network. The message indicates this is a probe targeting a Palo Alto Firewall Management Interface. This suggests an attempt to discover or interact with a Palo Alto firewall's management interface, potentially for reconnaissance or exploitation.
This rule detects TCP connections originating from the internal network ($HOME_NET) to any external destination on port 9150, specifically looking for the SYN flag in the TCP handshake. Port 9150 is commonly associated with Tor Browser's SOCKS proxy. The rule's message suggests it's intended to identify instances where Tor Browser is being used to access external resources, potentially bypassing organizational policies or security controls.
This rule detects attempts to overwrite router firmware via an SSH session. It specifically looks for the string "flash write" within TCP traffic directed to port 22 (SSH) on the home network. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to modify the router's operating system, potentially for persistence, backdooring, or other malicious purposes.
This rule detects internal network traffic to port 3128, which is commonly used by Squid proxy servers. The rule is specifically looking for a high volume of such connections (10 connections within 60 seconds from the same source IP) within the home network, suggesting the use of a Squid proxy for internal command and control (C2) routing. The 'flow:to_server,established' indicates that the rule triggers on established connections from a client within the home network to a server within the home network on port 3128.
This rule detects the use of MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) over TLS on port 8883, specifically identifying it as a potential encrypted Command and Control (C2) channel. It triggers an alert if there are at least 5 established TCP connections to port 8883 from a single source within a 60-second window, indicating persistent communication often associated with C2 activities.
This rule detects non-HTTPS/non-HTTP traffic attempting to tunnel over TCP port 443. It specifically looks for established TCP connections to port 443 where the application layer protocol is neither TLS nor HTTP, indicating potential covert communication or tunneling activity often associated with malware or command and control.
This rule detects large data transfers (over 65KB) to a remote host via SSH SCP (port 22) within the home network. It uses a thresholding mechanism to alert if 30 such transfers occur within a 60-second window from the same source.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration or unauthorized copying of data from USB drives via an SSH SCP session. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) within the home network, where the data flow is from the client to the server (upload). The rule triggers if the content of the SCP session includes both "/media/" and "/usb" (case-insensitive), indicating paths commonly associated with mounted USB devices on Linux systems, and the data size is greater than 1000 bytes. This suggests that contents from a USB drive are being copied off the system over SSH.
This rule detects potential bulk email collection activity over IMAP. It triggers when a client makes 30 or more IMAP 'FETCH' commands containing 'BODY[]' (indicating a request for the full email body) to a server on port 143 within a 60-second window. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker or malicious insider exfiltrating a large number of emails from an IMAP server.
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