Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

868 detections

Detects network traffic patterns indicative of a Netcat-based reverse shell associated with the UAT-11823 (Sandworm) threat group. The rule monitors for characteristic command output such as 'uid=' and 'gid=', shell error strings containing '/bin/sh', and root shell prompts ('root@#') following suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-20079.
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Ali AlEnezi@site
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
407
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
004
Detects a malicious command sequence targeting Redis instances where an attacker uses 'CONFIG SET' to modify the 'dir' and 'dbfilename' configuration directives followed by a 'SLAVEOF' or 'REPLICAOF' command. This is a common exploit pattern used to achieve remote code execution by forcing the Redis instance to load a malicious database file (often containing binary webshells or cron jobs) from an attacker-controlled server.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
201
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware, specifically the use of 'frpc' (Fast Reverse Proxy Client) to establish a persistent reverse proxy tunnel. The rule monitors for established outbound connections containing the specific byte sequence characteristic of this tool, which is often used by adversaries to facilitate Command and Control (C2) communication.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
102
Detects high-frequency connection attempts to TCP port 445 within the internal network or across RFC1918 subnets, indicating potential reconnaissance activity such as SMB share scanning commonly associated with lateral movement or network mapping.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
202
Detects a specific raw TCP handshake sequence used by the VelvetCake downloader malware to authenticate with its Command and Control (C2) server. The rule monitors for a 'PASSWORD ' string followed by a 'GET qqq' command in the initiation of an established outbound TCP connection.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
003
Detects anomalous MS_T120 channel binding and MCS handshake patterns characteristic of the BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft RDP services.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
003
Detection rules identifying malformed RDP MCS Connect Initial PDUs and unusual service crashes following RDP connection attempts, both indicative of exploitation attempts against the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
This rule detects periodic network beaconing patterns consistent with BabylonRAT malware. It flags established TCP connections to external networks that occur at a frequency exceeding 5 connections within a 300-second window, which may indicate a C2 check-in mechanism. Due to the heuristic nature of this detection, it is recommended to tune the threshold and correlate with payload analysis or entropy inspection to reduce noise.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects periodic network beaconing patterns consistent with BabylonRAT malware. It flags established TCP connections to external networks that occur at a frequency exceeding 5 connections within a 300-second window, which may indicate a C2 check-in mechanism. Due to the heuristic nature of this detection, it is recommended to tune the threshold and correlate with payload analysis or entropy inspection to reduce noise.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
003
This rule monitors network traffic to detect a specific 'Client Hello' beaconing behavior associated with the RMRLX Remote Access Trojan (RAT), identifying potential command-and-control communication directed at a known malicious IP address over TCP port 4561.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects established outbound TCP connections to a known AsyncRAT C2 IP address on port 4944. This rule identifies infected internal hosts communicating with a malicious server typically used for remote access and control.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects high-frequency connection attempts to PPTP (1723) and L2TP (1701) VPN ports from an external source, indicative of automated scanning or vulnerability discovery activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects high-frequency TCP SYN connection attempts originating from external networks targeting common administrative or tunneling ports (1723/PPTP, 1701/L2TP, 22/SSH) on internal systems. The detection uses a threshold of 100 connection attempts within 120 seconds, which is characteristic of automated reconnaissance and network scanning behavior.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
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