Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.
The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication requests initiated from non-domain controller locations. It leverages EventCode 4662 to detect when a computer account with replication permissions creates a handle to domainDNS, filtering out known domain controller IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DCSync attack, where an attacker with privileged access can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential full domain compromise.
Detects potential DCSync attacks by identifying Event ID 4662 where specific DS-Replication access rights are used by a non-domain controller. This rule specifically looks for attempts to replicate directory changes (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set) from an IP address that is not a known domain controller, while also excluding common system accounts.
Detects the addition of a member to a sensitive Active Directory group related to VMware administration (e.g., 'vSphere Admins', 'ESX Admins') using net.exe executed via WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This behavior is a key TTP used by threat groups like UNC3944 to escalate privileges and gain control over the vSphere environment after an initial compromise.
KQL Query from file: Sentinel KQL Detection for ShadowHound
KQL Query from file: Detect Microsoft Graph API Abuse
KQL Query from file: Password Spraying Detection in Active Directory
KQL Query from file: NEW Real-time Anomalous Token Detection
KQL Query from file: Detect Privilege Admin under AiTM attack
KQL Query from file: BadSuccessor Detection
KQL Query from file: Hunting fasthttp Bruteforce Campaign
KQL Query from file: Entra Admin Roles Query
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding itself to a new app role assignment. This activity is indicative of privilege escalation within an Azure Active Directory environment, where a service principal grants itself additional permissions.
This analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) events containing `adsisearcher`, `objectcategory=computer`, and methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is indicative of Active Directory discovery, which adversaries or Red Teams perform to gain situational awareness and identify potential targets for lateral movement.
This analytic detects modifications to the default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in an Active Directory environment. It leverages Splunk's Admon to monitor updates to the "Default Domain Policy" and "Default Domain Controllers Policy." This activity is significant because changes to these default GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to gain further control, establish persistence, or deploy malware across multiple hosts. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread policy enforcement changes, unauthorized access, and potential compromise of the entire domain environment.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_Computer` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify queries targeting domain computers using WMI. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for Active Directory Discovery and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain computers, facilitating further attacks such as lateral movement or privilege escalation.
'Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory.
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
'Identifies accounts that have been added to a PIM managed privileged group'
'Looks for multiple users that had their admin role removed by a single user within a certain period.
The default threshold is 5 removals, this can be edited in the query.'
The default threshold is 5 removals, this can be edited in the query.'
This query shows all modifications to highly sensitive active directory groups (also known as Tier 0). An example of these groups include Domain Admins, Schema Admins and Enterprise Admins.
More info can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/security/compass/privileged-access-access-model#evolution-from-the-legacy-ad-tier-model
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
This advanced hunting query requires Defender for Identity be deployed due to it's reliance on the IdentityDirectoryEvents table.
More info can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/security/compass/privileged-access-access-model#evolution-from-the-legacy-ad-tier-model
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
This advanced hunting query requires Defender for Identity be deployed due to it's reliance on the IdentityDirectoryEvents table.
Detect multiple Active Directory LDAP queries made in bin time
Replace 10 on line 1 with your desired thershold
Replace 1m on line 2 with your desired bin time
Replace 10 on line 1 with your desired thershold
Replace 1m on line 2 with your desired bin time
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