Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, specifically focusing on changes that apply deny permissions to prevent enumeration of object permissions. Such modifications can be used by adversaries for persistence or to hide malicious objects within Active Directory by making them harder to discover.
This detection monitors the addition of dangerous Access Control Lists (ACLs) to an Active Directory user object. Specifically, it looks for modifications that grant "Full control", "All extended rights", "All validated writes", "Create all child objects", "Delete all child objects", "Delete subtree", "Delete", "Modify permissions", "Modify owner", or "Write all properties" to a user object. Such modifications can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity within the Active Directory environment. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
This analytic detects instances where a user adds themselves to an Active Directory (AD) group. This activity is a common indicator of privilege escalation, where a user attempts to gain unauthorized access to higher privileges or sensitive resources. By monitoring AD logs, this detection identifies such suspicious behavior, which could be part of a larger attack strategy aimed at compromising critical systems and data.
The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments querying specific elevated domain groups. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes that access the LDAP namespace and search for groups like "Domain Admins" or "Enterprise Admins." This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privilege accounts within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, allowing attackers to gain elevated access and control over critical network resources.
This rule detects the deletion of Access Control List (ACL) entries on the domain root object within Active Directory. Such an action is a significant change with high impact, as it can alter fundamental security permissions for the entire domain. Microsoft guidance suggests that all changes at this level should be reviewed. The rule extracts details about the old and new ACL values, the operation type, the affected object, and the user performing the action. It also attempts to resolve SIDs to user or group names for better context.
This analytic detects an increase in modifications to Active Directory groups or objects. Frequent changes to AD groups or objects can indicate potential security risks, such as unauthorized access attempts, impairing defenses, or establishing persistence. By monitoring AD logs for unusual modification patterns, this detection helps identify suspicious behavior that could compromise the integrity and security of the AD environment. The rule specifically looks for a statistically significant increase in the number of unique objects modified by a source user over a 5-minute span, compared to their historical average and standard deviation.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. This activity is identified by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) and looking for specific keywords like `[adsisearcher]`, `SearchRooT`, and `gplink`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
This detection identifies when an Active Directory Group Policy Object (GPO) is disabled. Adversaries may disable GPOs to impair defenses, remove security policies, or facilitate other malicious activities within the domain. The rule specifically looks for EventCode 5136 with AttributeLDAPDisplayName 'flags' and an AttributeValue indicating the GPO is disabled (values 1, 2, or 3). It then joins this with Active Directory monitoring data to get the display name of the GPO.
The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages Event ID 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code 0x6, indicating the user is not found in the Kerberos database. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access and potential privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment.
This analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `-class ds_group` parameter. This activity indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.
The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with specific command-line arguments used to discover remote systems within a domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
This rule detects when an Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) conditional access policy has been modified. It specifically looks for 'USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT' events within Office 365, targeting the 'AzureActiveDirectory' application, where the 'extendedAuditEventCategory' is 'Policy' and the 'product_event_type' is 'Update policy.'. This indicates a change to a conditional access policy, which could be a legitimate administrative action or a malicious attempt to alter security controls.
This rule detects the execution of PingCastle, a legitimate tool used for auditing Active Directory security. Adversaries often leverage such tools during the reconnaissance phase to gather information about the target environment, specifically Active Directory configurations, user accounts, and potential vulnerabilities. The rule identifies PingCastle execution by matching specific MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes of the executable, its original filename, product name, and various command-line arguments associated with its scanning functionalities.
Detects read access to a domain user object from a non-machine account, which can indicate user enumeration activity within Active Directory. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 4662 (An operation was performed on an object) where the ObjectType corresponds to a user object and the AccessMask includes read property permissions. It filters out activity from machine accounts and specific Microsoft Online (MSOL) accounts to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2021-42287, a vulnerability related to Active Directory's SAM Account Name Spoofing. The exploit involves an attacker creating a computer object with known credentials, then clearing its ServicePrincipalName attribute. This manipulation grants the attacker additional permissions on the object, enabling further changes. The detection specifically looks for Event IDs 16990 (Object class and UserAccountControl validation failure) and 16991 (SAM Account Name validation failure) from the Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM provider, which indicate issues during the creation or modification of Active Directory objects that are characteristic of this attack.
This rule detects when an application is granted delegated or app role permissions within Microsoft Graph, Exchange, SharePoint, or Azure AD. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or elevate privileges by giving a malicious application access to sensitive resources.
This rule detects sign-in attempts originating from IP addresses that Microsoft Entra ID Protection has identified as malicious. These IP addresses are known to be associated with attackers or compromised systems at the time of the sign-in, indicating a high-risk authentication attempt.
Detects attempts to modify the Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) of Active Directory objects, specifically looking for WRITE_DAC access (0x40000). This can indicate an adversary attempting to gain control over Active Directory objects, potentially for privilege escalation or persistence.
This rule detects the execution of 'adidnsdump' via 'python.exe'. Adidnsdump is a tool used for enumerating and exporting all DNS records in an Active Directory integrated DNS zone. This activity is typically performed for reconnaissance purposes within internal networks, allowing an attacker to gather information about the network's structure and resources by querying/modifying DNS records via LDAP.
Detects the usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll" DLL. This DLL is often used by attackers to perform Active Directory enumeration, especially in environments where RSAT (Remote Server Administration Tools) are not installed or administrative privileges are not available.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that utilize the `System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher` object to enumerate Active Directory for computer objects. Specifically, it looks for the creation of this object, the addition of properties to load (like 'name'), and the execution of `findall()` to retrieve results. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover domain-joined computers within an Active Directory environment.
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