Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
54 detections
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Detects the use of netsh.exe to create a firewall rule that blocks all outbound traffic. This technique is often used by attackers to isolate a compromised host from external resources (like security tool cloud consoles) while maintaining internal network access for lateral movement.
This rule detects suspicious modifications to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations via `reg.exe` and `netsh.exe`. Specifically, it looks for attempts to enable RDP by setting `fDenyTSConnections` to 0, modify the `UserAuthentication` setting in `RDP-Tcp` to 0, or add a firewall rule to allow RDP traffic on port 3389. These actions can indicate an adversary attempting to establish or facilitate remote access to a system.
Detects potential Dtrack RAT activity by identifying specific command-line patterns associated with network discovery and system information gathering. The rule looks for the execution of 'ping' with specific arguments, 'ipconfig /all' redirecting output to a temporary file, and 'netsh interface ip show config' also redirecting output to a temporary file. These commands are commonly used by Dtrack for reconnaissance.
This rule detects the execution of common Windows command-line utilities used for system network configuration discovery. Adversaries often use these commands to gather information about the network environment, including IP addresses, network interfaces, ARP tables, NetBIOS information, and routing tables. The specific commands monitored are 'ipconfig /all', 'netsh interface show interface', 'arp -a', 'nbtstat -n', 'net config', and 'route print'.
Detects various activities associated with the 'Operation Wocao' campaign, including the use of 'checkadmin.exe', 'netsh' commands to modify firewall rules, PowerShell execution with bypass and encoded commands, scheduled task creation, and attempts to query KeePass configuration files and PuTTY sessions from the registry. These activities indicate potential privilege escalation, persistence, discovery, and defense evasion techniques used by the threat actor.
The following analytic detects the modification of firewall settings to allow file and printer sharing. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving 'netsh' commands that enable file and printer sharing. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt by ransomware to discover and encrypt files on additional machines connected to the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across the network, significantly increasing the impact of a ransomware attack.
The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving the 'netsh' command to enable network discovery. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware, such as REvil and RedDot, to discover and compromise additional machines on the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across multiple hosts, significantly amplifying the impact of the ransomware attack.
This analytic identifies processes launching netsh.exe, a command-line utility used to modify network configurations. It detects this activity by analyzing data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant because netsh.exe can be exploited to execute malicious helper DLLs, serving as a persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistent access, modify network settings, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the network's integrity and security.
This rule detects the execution of 'netsh.exe' with command-line arguments indicating an attempt to discover firewall configurations. Specifically, it looks for 'netsh' combined with 'show firewall' and additional keywords like 'config', 'state', or 'rule', or 'name=all'. This activity is often performed by adversaries to understand the network environment and identify potential egress points or defensive measures.
Detects the removal of a port or application rule in the Windows Firewall configuration using the netsh.exe command-line utility. This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses to facilitate further malicious activity.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows firewall to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "netsh.exe" to allow TCP port 3389. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain remote access to a compromised host, a common tactic for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the system, leading to potential data exfiltration or further network compromise.
Detects the execution of netsh with "add helper" flag in order to add a custom helper DLL. This technique can be abused to add a malicious helper DLL that can be used as a persistence proxy that gets called when netsh.exe is executed.
Detects the execution of netsh with "add helper" flag in order to add a custom helper DLL. This technique can be abused to add a malicious helper DLL that can be used as a persistence proxy that gets called when netsh.exe is executed.
Detects netsh commands that turns off the Windows firewall
This query will show rare firewall rule changes using netsh utility by comparing rule names and program names from the previous day
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
Detects netsh commands that turns off the Windows firewall
wifikeys
KQL
Detect if someone run netsh and try to expose WPA keys in clear text
@mattiasborg82.
Blog.sec-labs.com.
@mattiasborg82.
Blog.sec-labs.com.
This rule detects the use of the `netsh interface portproxy` command to enable port forwarding, specifically looking for `v4tov4` configurations. It also identifies the creation or modification of associated registry settings under `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4`, which are indicative of port proxying being configured on a Windows system.
The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.
The analytic detects modifications to Windows Proxy settings via registry keys, specifically focusing on the path `*\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp*`. This activity is significant because `netsh.exe` can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever `netsh.exe` runs. This could enable persistence, network configuration manipulation, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
The analytic identifies the disabling of the firewall using the netsh application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include keywords like "firewall," "off," or "disable." This activity is significant because disabling the firewall can expose the system to external threats, allowing malware to communicate with its command and control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, further malware downloads, and broader network compromise.
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