Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Trickbot: Pervasive & underestimated.
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Emulation-evading JavaScripts.
Attackers in several ransomware campaigns have employed heavily obfuscated JavaScript code, in order to implant malware or execute malicious commands. The obfuscation is intended to help the code evade security systems and potentially escape sandbox environments.
The following query detects when Word or File Explorer have launched files with a .jse extension. Attackers involved in various human-operated campaigns have been known to embed a heavily obfuscated JavaScript file in malicious Word docs. The loader is used to download and install the banking trojan, Trickbot.
See Detect .jse file creation events for a similar technique.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
Attackers in several ransomware campaigns have employed heavily obfuscated JavaScript code, in order to implant malware or execute malicious commands. The obfuscation is intended to help the code evade security systems and potentially escape sandbox environments.
The following query detects when Word or File Explorer have launched files with a .jse extension. Attackers involved in various human-operated campaigns have been known to embed a heavily obfuscated JavaScript file in malicious Word docs. The loader is used to download and install the banking trojan, Trickbot.
See Detect .jse file creation events for a similar technique.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Trickbot: Pervasive & underestimated.
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command and control (C2) operations.
Trickbot operators are known to use the legitimate Windows process rundll.exe to perform malicious activities, such as reconnaissance. Once a target is infected, the operator will drop a batch file that runs several commands and connects to a C2 server for further action.
The following query detects suspicious rundll.exe activity associated with Trickbot campaigns.
See Office applications launching wscript.exe to run JScript for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command and control (C2) operations.
Trickbot operators are known to use the legitimate Windows process rundll.exe to perform malicious activities, such as reconnaissance. Once a target is infected, the operator will drop a batch file that runs several commands and connects to a C2 server for further action.
The following query detects suspicious rundll.exe activity associated with Trickbot campaigns.
See Office applications launching wscript.exe to run JScript for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
This rule detects the execution of 'esentutl' with the '/p' parameter. This command-line utility is used for database utilities, and its use with '/p' (repair mode) can be leveraged by adversaries to access or repair Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) databases, including the NTDS.dit file which contains Active Directory credential information. This technique has been observed in use by threat actors like Conti ransomware and Trickbot to gather credentials or other sensitive information from compromised systems.
This analytic detects executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising additional systems within the network.
The analytic detects suspicious PowerShell processes attempting to inject code into critical Windows processes using CreateRemoteThread. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify instances where PowerShell spawns threads in processes like svchost.exe, csrss.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as TrickBot and offensive tools like Cobalt Strike to execute malicious payloads, establish reverse shells, or download additional malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.
This analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows that use the rundll32 command. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, which logs the creation of scheduled tasks, and filters for tasks executed via rundll32. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malware, such as TrickBot, to persist in an environment or deliver additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.
This analytic identifies suspicious process names using a pre-trained Deep Learning model. It analyzes Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to classify process names as benign or suspicious based on a threshold score. This detection is significant for identifying malware, such as TrickBot, which often uses randomly generated filenames to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate the presence of malware capable of propagating across the network and executing harmful actions.
The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating or connecting to a named pipe. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe, a legitimate Windows OS Problem Reporting application, is often abused by malware such as Trickbot and Qakbot to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that an attacker has injected code into wermgr.exe, potentially allowing them to communicate covertly, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The following analytic detects the spawning of cmd or PowerShell processes by the wermgr.exe process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process telemetry, including parent-child process relationships and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with code injection techniques used by malware like TrickBot to execute shellcode or malicious DLL modules. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system security.
The analytic detects the `wermgr.exe` process creating an executable file. This behavior is unusual because `wermgr.exe` is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate TrickBot malware, which injects code into `wermgr.exe` to execute malicious actions like downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
Detects a specific process tree pattern associated with Trickbot malware, where 'rundll32.exe' acts as the parent process for 'wermgr.exe', and the parent command line contains 'DllRegisterServer'. This pattern indicates the execution of a DLL via rundll32.exe, which then launches wermgr.exe, a known behavior of Trickbot.
This YARA rule detects the TrickBot trojan by identifying specific byte sequences ($entry_setup, $decrypt_function_snippet, $decrypt_function_snippet_wrapper) commonly found in its executable code. The rule requires the presence of the standard Windows PE magic number (0x5A4D) at the beginning of the file, along with the $entry_setup pattern, and at least one of the decryption function snippets.
Yara rule that detects TrickBot trojan.
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