Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious user-agent strings in Microsoft Graph activity logs that are commonly associated with reconnaissance and attack tools targeting Azure AD and Microsoft 365 environments. These tools include BloodHound, ROADtools, AADInternals, and various other utilities used for enumeration, credential spraying, and other malicious activities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commandlets commonly associated with well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks and tools. This rule identifies specific commandlet names within process command lines, indicating potential malicious activity such as credential dumping, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, persistence, and lateral movement.
Detects the use of known malicious PowerShell commandlets often associated with exploitation frameworks. These commandlets perform various adversarial actions such as credential dumping, reconnaissance, persistence, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration.
KQL Query from file: Threat Hunting AzureHound Usage
Roasting
KQL
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for Kerberoasting (SPNs) or accounts with Kerberos preauthentication not required from Azure ATP, and try to get the process initiated the LDAP query from MDATP.
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
// Detect multiple sensitive Active Directory LDAP queries made in bin time
// Sensitive queries defined as Roasting or sensitive objects queries
// Replace 10 on line 6 with your desired thershold
// Replace 1m on line 7 with your desired bin time
// This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
// Sensitive queries defined as Roasting or sensitive objects queries
// Replace 10 on line 6 with your desired thershold
// Replace 1m on line 7 with your desired bin time
// This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for sensitive objects in the organization
This LDAP query cover BloodHound tool
This LDAP query cover BloodHound tool
This analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.
The analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.
This rule detects the execution of various known hacktools on Linux systems by monitoring process creation events and matching against a predefined list of tool names in the 'Image' field. The tools covered include C2 frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Havoc, Merlin, Sliver), network scanners (e.g., Nmap derivatives, Nuclei, Recon-ng), web enumeration tools (e.g., Dirb, Ffuf, Gobuster), web vulnerability scanners (e.g., Nikto, WPSCan), and other exploit/post-exploitation tools (e.g., Aircrack-ng, Bloodhound-Python, Hashcat, Hydra, John, SQLMap, PEASS-ng).
This rule detects the execution of BloodHound and SharpHound, which are reconnaissance tools used to map Active Directory environments. It identifies these tools by their product name, description, company name, executable image names, and specific command-line arguments often used for data collection, such as 'CollectionMethod All', '--Loop', '--PortScanTimeout', '-JsonFolder', '-ZipFileName', 'DCOnly', and '--NoSaveCache', as well as PowerShell cmdlets like 'Invoke-Bloodhound' and 'Get-BloodHoundData'.
This rule detects the creation of specific files that are commonly generated by the BloodHound collection tool, SharpHound. These files, such as 'BloodHound.zip', '_computers.json', '_domains.json', '_groups.json', and others, contain collected Active Directory information. The presence of these files on a system indicates that BloodHound or SharpHound has been used for reconnaissance, which is often a precursor to further malicious activity within an Active Directory environment.
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