Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
137 detections
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Detects suspicious file transfer and subsequent execution activity associated with the ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) remote access application, which may indicate exploitation of file-transfer vulnerabilities. The rule monitors for ScreenConnect processes dropping executable or script files to disk followed by the spawning of command interpreters to execute those files.
Detects suspicious use of QEMU virtualization software within an environment, specifically when associated with ConnectWise ScreenConnect. This includes the creation of custom QEMU image files within the ScreenConnect Files directory, the execution of the QEMU binary using those images, the extraction of QEMU archives using 7-Zip, or instances where ScreenConnect processes spawn the QEMU binary directly. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized use of virtual machines to facilitate persistence, lateral movement, or tool staging.
Detects the execution of ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe with command line arguments containing 'servermanagemen' or 'Microsoft Update Service'. This pattern is often associated with the use of ConnectWise (ScreenConnect) remote access software, which can be leveraged for legitimate administration or malicious remote control.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) directed towards known attacker-controlled command-and-control domains associated with AsyncRAT and ScreenConnect abuse.
Detects the execution of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise) remote support client processes with command line arguments indicative of a remote session initiation (e.g., Guest access connection). This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or remote control of compromised systems.
This rule detects DNS queries to domains associated with tunneling tools (Ngrok, Tailscale) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (FleetDeck, TacticalRMM, Level.io, Pulseway, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, RustDesk, Atera, Remcos) known to be used by threat actors like Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra for covert persistent connectivity, remote access, and lateral movement. The rule categorizes the detected tools into 'Tunneling' or 'RMM'.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
Detects a browser-downloaded installer spawning ScreenConnect or another remote management client without an established software deployment parent. This rule identifies suspicious process creation where a known installer executable, likely downloaded from a browser (indicated by paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData), initiates a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool such as ScreenConnect or ConnectWiseControl. This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing remote access.
Detects a ScreenConnect client launched with several repeated c= custom fields, which can carry attacker configuration and campaign metadata. This behavior has been observed in cryptojacking campaigns abusing ScreenConnect.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects a remote support or loader process spawning a suspended process or invoking commands associated with RunPE and hollowing. This rule specifically looks for processes initiated by 'ScreenConnect', 'SimpleRunPE', or 'ClientService' that include command-line arguments indicative of process hollowing or injection techniques such as 'CREATE_SUSPENDED', 'NtUnmapViewOfSection', 'RunPE', 'hollow', or 'process injection'.
Detects outbound network traffic to the ScreenConnect service specifically targeting the /Relay/ path, which is commonly abused by ransomware operators (e.g., Interlock, RansomHub) for establishing unauthorized remote access and command-and-control channels.
Detects outbound network traffic to the ScreenConnect service specifically targeting the /Relay/ path, which is commonly abused by ransomware operators (e.g., Interlock, RansomHub) for establishing unauthorized remote access and command-and-control channels.
Detects a ScreenConnect client launched with several repeated c= custom fields, which can carry attacker configuration and campaign metadata. This behavior has been observed in cryptojacking campaigns abusing ScreenConnect.
Detects ScreenConnect or another remote support process directly spawning a mining executable or script. This rule identifies suspicious process creation where a known remote management tool (ScreenConnect, ConnectWiseControl, ClientService) initiates a process with command-line arguments or filenames indicative of cryptocurrency mining (e.g., xmrig, lolminer, nbminer, stratum, wallet, gpu).
Identifies the ScreenConnect Client Service initiating network traffic to the domain 'directdownload.icu', which has been associated with cryptojacking campaigns. This activity indicates potential compromise and resource hijacking.
Detects the creation of the 'WinSysCache' registry run key to launch 'RuntimeHost.exe', which is indicative of cryptojacking activity often associated with abuse of ScreenConnect.
Correlates RuntimeHost.exe spawning suspended MSBuild.exe to inject mining shellcode, followed by network activity. This behavior is indicative of cryptojacking campaigns abusing ScreenConnect and .NET utilities.
Detects a utility-themed parent process launching msiexec with a ScreenConnect or remote support installer and quiet options. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to establish remote access covertly.
Detects when a ScreenConnect installer or related process loads the 'vcredist_x64.dll' file from a temporary, downloads, or AppData folder. This behavior can indicate DLL side-loading, where a malicious DLL is placed in a location that a legitimate application will search before its intended, trusted location, potentially for privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects the installation or execution of ScreenConnect originating from the Azure Run Command extension context. This indicates potential unauthorized remote access tool deployment.
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