Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
6 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
4
2
Contributors
4
2
Categories
6
2
2
2
2
Platforms
6
2
2
Products / Services
2
2
2
2
2
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,586
8,396
6,226
This rule detects the execution of processes with command-line arguments indicative of AvosLocker ransomware activity. It specifically looks for keywords such as 'avoslocker', 'av0s', 'locker-payload', and 'av0s-ransom' within process command lines, which are known indicators of this ransomware.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects the execution of processes with command-line arguments indicative of AvosLocker ransomware activity. It specifically looks for keywords such as 'avoslocker', 'av0s', 'locker-payload', and 'av0s-ransom' within process command lines, which are known indicators of this ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the AvosLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte sequences (strings) within executable files. The rule looks for patterns associated with file enumeration ($find_files), resource enumeration ($enum_resources), key import operations ($import_key), and file encryption routines ($encrypt_files). All four string patterns must be present in a file, and the file must start with the MZ header (0x5A4D) to be considered a match.
Yara rule that detects AvosLocker ransomware.