Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of the 'reg.exe' utility to export or save sensitive Windows Registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM) within a short timeframe on a single host. This pattern of credential dumping from the Registry is characteristic of INCRansom activity and other credential harvesting techniques.
This rule detects the dumping of sensitive Windows Registry hives (SECURITY, SAM, and SYSTEM) using tools like reg.exe, esentutl.exe, regedit.exe, or by leveraging Volume Shadow Copy services (vssadmin/diskshadow). These hives are targeted by attackers for credential access, specifically to extract LSA secrets, local account hashes, and bootkeys required to decrypt credentials offline. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of hives dumped, the method used, the output destination, and the parent process context, flagging 'complete' dumps (SAM+SECURITY+SYSTEM) as critical.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility esentutl.exe to copy sensitive registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM). This is a known technique used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping by accessing the registry hive files.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility esentutl.exe to copy sensitive registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM). This is a known technique used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping by accessing the registry hive files.
Detects the use of the native Windows 'reg.exe' utility to export sensitive registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM) commonly targeted by adversaries for offline credential extraction.
Detects the use of reg.exe to save the HKLM\SAM registry hive to a file path outside of standard system directories. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping attempts, where adversaries attempt to bypass endpoint security behavioral detection rules that monitor for SAM file access in common locations by using alternative, potentially allowlisted paths.
Detects potential credential dumping activity targeting sensitive files like NTDS.dit, SAM, and SYSTEM hives. This rule monitors for three primary indicators: unauthorized invocation of vssuirun.exe (often used for Volume Shadow Copy manipulation), exploitation of print command utilities to access sensitive system files, and the staging of critical credential files into temporary directory paths.
This rule detects attempts to access the NTDS.dit file or the SYSTEM registry hive, indicated by Security Event ID 4656. Multiple access attempts within an hour are summarized by the subject user name.
Detects inbound RPC calls to the Windows Remote Registry interface using operation numbers associated with registry save/backup operations, which may indicate credential dumping via remote registry access. This rule specifically looks for RPC UUID '338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003' and operation numbers 20 or 31, which correspond to registry save/backup functions.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
Detects attempts to access or exfiltrate the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) or SYSTEM registry hives, which are primary targets for extracting credential hashes. This rule identifies common attack vectors including native Windows registry utilities (reg.exe), PowerShell-based volume shadow copy techniques (Invoke-NinjaCopy), and known credential dumping tools like secretsdump (from the Impacket suite) executed via command line or interpreted through Python.
This rule detects attempts to acquire Windows credentials by accessing critical registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) or their shadow copies. It looks for the use of 'reg save' to export hives, as well as direct file access to these hives or their shadow copy variations by non-standard system processes.
Detects the execution of Mimikatz or its common command-line arguments used for credential dumping. This rule identifies attempts to extract sensitive authentication material such as passwords, hashes, and tickets from memory (LSASS), SAM database, LSA secrets, and cached domain credentials.
This rule detects repeated access attempts (3 or more within an hour) to critical credential storage processes or files, specifically lsass.exe, the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, or the NTDS.dit file. Such activity is indicative of credential theft attempts by an adversary.
Detects attempts by non-system user accounts to access the SAM or SECURITY registry hives. These hives contain sensitive credential material, and unauthorized access is a common indicator of credential dumping activities, often associated with tools like Mimikatz or scripts attempting to extract local account hashes.
Detects attempts by non-system user accounts to access the SAM or SECURITY registry hives. These hives contain sensitive credential material, and unauthorized access is a common indicator of credential dumping activities, often associated with tools like Mimikatz or scripts attempting to extract local account hashes.
Detects the execution of portable Impacket tools ('mini_imp'), including psexec.py, secretsdump.py, and ntlmrelayx.py. This activity is indicative of potential credential harvesting, remote service execution, or NTLM relay attacks, as observed in the MexicanMafia 'Operation Escaneo' campaign.
Detects attempts to extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, either by using the 'reg save' utility to export registry hives containing the SAM or by directly creating/modifying the SAM file on disk outside of known legitimate system processes.
Detects the execution of Mimikatz or its common command-line arguments used for credential dumping. This rule identifies attempts to extract sensitive authentication material such as passwords, hashes, and tickets from memory (LSASS), SAM database, LSA secrets, and cached domain credentials.
Detects the use of wbadmin.exe to initiate a system backup that targets sensitive Active Directory and registry files (NTDS.dit, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives) to a local SMB share on the loopback address. This technique is used by threat actors to stage critical credential material for offline extraction and cracking.
Detects attempts to extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, either by using the 'reg save' utility to export registry hives containing the SAM or by directly creating/modifying the SAM file on disk outside of known legitimate system processes.
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