Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects activity associated with the unauthorized copying of sensitive system files (e.g., NTDS.dit, SAM, SYSTEM) using Volume Shadow Copy, or the use of Rclone for potential data exfiltration via SFTP, copy, or sync operations.
Detects the execution of portable Impacket tools ('mini_imp'), including psexec.py, secretsdump.py, and ntlmrelayx.py. This activity is indicative of potential credential harvesting, remote service execution, or NTLM relay attacks, as observed in the MexicanMafia 'Operation Escaneo' campaign.
Detects the execution of known forensic imaging tools (FTK Imager or AD Imager) or commands interacting with the Active Directory database (ntds.dit). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized attempts to extract credential hashes from the NTDS.dit file for offline cracking.
Detects the execution of known forensic imaging tools (FTK Imager or AD Imager) or commands interacting with the Active Directory database (ntds.dit). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized attempts to extract credential hashes from the NTDS.dit file for offline cracking.
This rule detects attempts to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory or the NTDS.dit file, which are common targets for credential dumping. It specifically looks for Security Event ID 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) where the ObjectName is either 'lsass.exe' or 'ntds.dit' and the AccessMask indicates read or all access permissions. The rule then summarizes these events by user, computer, and IP address, flagging if two or more such events occur.
Detects attempts to access or copy the Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) by monitoring for direct file access to the file or the execution of ntdsutil.exe with arguments intended to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which is a known technique for exfiltrating the NTDS.dit file for offline password cracking.
This rule detects suspicious SMB traffic targeting raw disk volumes (e.g., PhysicalDrive, C:) or sensitive Windows files such as NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive files. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping attempts, often performed using tools like secretsdump.py or Invoke-NinjaCopy, which bypass standard file system access controls to exfiltrate critical system credentials.
Detects potential credential dumping activities and unauthorized access to sensitive system files. The rule monitors for three primary indicators: raw disk device access (often associated with volume shadow copy dumping), suspicious DiskShadow utility execution, and NTDS.dit extraction using ntdsutil. Known administrative and backup software processes are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects the execution of known credential dumping tools and techniques on Windows systems. This includes targeting LSASS process memory using procdump or rundll32 with comsvcs.dll, and attempts to extract NTDS.dit via ntdsutil, vssadmin, or diskshadow.
Detects the unauthorized access or copying of the Active Directory NTDS.dit database file, a common credential harvesting technique. The rule monitors for the execution of ntdsutil.exe or vssadmin.exe with arguments typically used to create shadow copies or extract the NTDS database, specifically when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects the threat actor abusing ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) dump of the Active Directory database for offline credential cracking.
Detects unauthorized attempts to extract the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) for credential harvesting. The rule monitors for common administrative tools like ntdsutil.exe and vssadmin.exe being used to create shadow copies or extract the NTDS database, as well as direct file manipulation of ntds.dit. This activity is often associated with post-exploitation credential dumping techniques.
Detects the use of the native Windows Backup utility (wbadmin.exe) to initiate a backup that specifically includes the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to perform offline Active Directory credential dumping by creating a backup of the database to an accessible location.
Detects the use of wbadmin.exe to initiate a system backup that targets sensitive Active Directory and registry files (NTDS.dit, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives) to a local SMB share on the loopback address. This technique is used by threat actors to stage critical credential material for offline extraction and cracking.
Detects attempts to access or copy the Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) by monitoring for direct file access to the file or the execution of ntdsutil.exe with arguments intended to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which is a known technique for exfiltrating the NTDS.dit file for offline password cracking.
Detects the creation of a file named 'NTDS.zip', which is a common naming convention used by adversaries when compressing the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) for staging and subsequent exfiltration.
This rule detects common credential dumping techniques targeting the LSASS process memory (using comsvcs.dll, procdump, or procdump64) and extraction of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) using ntdsutil, vssadmin, diskshadow, or esentutl. These activities are indicative of credential theft and domain-wide reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of built-in Windows utilities such as ntdsutil.exe, vssadmin.exe, and diskshadow.exe, often used by attackers to dump the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) or manipulate volume shadow copies for credential theft or data staging/destruction purposes.
Detects Active Directory dataset extraction techniques used by MexicanMafia (Operation Escaneo), including ntds.dit access, secretsdump execution, VSS shadow copy abuse, and BloodHound-style AD enumeration for long-term persistence and reconnaissance against critical infrastructure.
Detects Active Directory dataset extraction techniques used by MexicanMafia (Operation Escaneo), including ntds.dit access, secretsdump execution, VSS shadow copy abuse, and BloodHound-style AD enumeration for long-term persistence and reconnaissance against critical infrastructure.
Detects instances of wermgr.exe (Windows Error Reporting) interacting with Volume Shadow Copies or using specific Alternate Data Streams (WDFOO). This behavior is often associated with credential dumping tools (e.g., Mimikatz, SharpShadow) attempting to access sensitive files from shadow copies under the context of a non-system user, potentially indicating evasion techniques or credential harvesting.
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