Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
252 detections
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Query 1 shows you any network communication happened from endpoints to a specific Remote IP or Remote URL.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
'This identifies when a user account successfully logs onto a given App and within 1 minute fails to logon to a different App.
This may indicate a malicious attempt at accessing disallowed Apps for discovery or potential lateral movement'
This may indicate a malicious attempt at accessing disallowed Apps for discovery or potential lateral movement'
Query 1 shows you any network communication happened from endpoints to a specific Remote IP or Remote URL.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Cypherpunk ransomware leaves wake of tampered AVs.
Cypherpunk is a human-operated ransomware campaign named after the unusual .cypherpunk extension given to encrypted files. The attackers often used PSEXESVC, a service that helps the PsExe.exe utility run commands on a remote device. Both PSEXESVC and PsExe.exe are legitimate parts of Windows; however, they can be repurposed by attackers to perform malicious actions.
The query below can find instances of PSEXESVC being used to launch batch files, as often occurred in Cypherpunk attacks.
Cypherpunk is a human-operated ransomware campaign named after the unusual .cypherpunk extension given to encrypted files. The attackers often used PSEXESVC, a service that helps the PsExe.exe utility run commands on a remote device. Both PSEXESVC and PsExe.exe are legitimate parts of Windows; however, they can be repurposed by attackers to perform malicious actions.
The query below can find instances of PSEXESVC being used to launch batch files, as often occurred in Cypherpunk attacks.
Query 1 shows you any network communication happened from endpoints to a specific Remote IP or Remote URL.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
Device Logons from Unknown IP Addresses.
This query identifies device logons from IP addresses not associated with any machine in Defender ATP.
This query identifies device logons from IP addresses not associated with any machine in Defender ATP.
This query checks for alerts related to file drop and remote execution where the file name matches PsExec and similar tools used for distribution
This query looks for events that are near in time to a detected event.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
Dragon Fly
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_dragonfly.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query looks for events that are near in time to a detected event.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
Query #1 - Find the machines on which this file was seen.
TODO - set file hash to be a SHA1 hash of your choice...
TODO - set file hash to be a SHA1 hash of your choice...
Detects the use of command-line tools such as 'scp', 'rsync', and 'sftp' that are commonly used to copy files to or from remote systems. This activity can be indicative of an adversary transferring tools into an environment (Ingress Tool Transfer) or moving files laterally within a compromised network (Lateral Tool Transfer). The rule specifically looks for the presence of these tool names followed by a space and then a colon or an '@' symbol, which are characteristic of remote file operations.
This rule detects remote procedure calls (RPC) specifically targeting the Remote Registry Protocol (MS-RRP) interface (UUID: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003) for information collection. It filters out common administrative operations (OpNum 6, 7, 8, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 35) to reduce false positives, focusing on suspicious reconnaissance activities against the registry from a remote system.
Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary honeypot has had a login attempt. This indicates an adversary is attempting to access or interact with the honeypot's services, which could be part of reconnaissance, initial access, or lateral movement activities.
Detects the execution of PsExec, a legitimate but often abused tool for remote command execution. The rule specifically looks for the executable name 'psexec.exe' or its original filename 'psexec.c' in process creation events.
Detects the execution of 'cmd.exe' specifically when initiated by the AnyViewer Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) agent during a remote management session. This activity could indicate an adversary using the legitimate remote access tool to execute commands on a compromised system.
Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
The analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and monitors destination ports against a list of non-standard, high-risk port values often used in post-exploitation scenarios. Adversaries frequently configure tools like netcat, Meterpreter, or other backdoors to listen or connect over uncommon ports such as 4444, 2222, or 51820 to bypass standard monitoring and firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this activity may represent command and control (C2) tunneling, lateral movement, or unauthorized remote access.
This analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell commands that modify firewall rules to allow inbound traffic to a specific local port. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further exploitation.
The analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.
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