Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,695 detections

Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
27 days ago
002
This rule detects PowerShell processes initiated with command-line arguments that indicate obfuscation (e.g., -enc, -encodedCommand) or attempts to download or execute external content (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is commonly observed during the initial execution of malicious payloads or tool delivery.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
204
Detects behavioral patterns associated with the Everest ransomware loader, specifically the execution of a .NET host process from a non-standard parent, potentially indicating process injection, combined with network activity indicative of lateral movement or discovery, such as Wake-on-LAN packets or SMB scanning.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
4010
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
503
Detects the execution of the encryptbase64.ps1 PowerShell script when invoked by a process other than PowerShell or PowerShell Core. This behavior is indicative of NeedyMantis malware attempting to evade detection by executing scripts outside standard script hosts.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
This rule identifies potential prompt injection attempts against Microsoft Copilot and Azure OpenAI services by monitoring CloudAppEvents for specific adversarial markers, encoded instruction blocks, or hidden text patterns. It flags recurring attempts from a single user as suspicious probing activity.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
8014
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
27 days ago
001
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
27 days ago
001
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
27 days ago
001
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
27 days ago
001
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
27 days ago
001
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
103
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
104
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded command arguments (e.g., -enc, -EncodedCommand) combined with common web-request cmdlets or download-cradle patterns (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated remote payloads in memory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
303
Detects suspicious command-line patterns originating from the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This rule identifies the execution of various scripting engines or utilities like PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, and WScript/CScript when they are used with potentially malicious flags or command-line arguments, including encoded commands, hidden window styles, web-download strings, or direct HTA/scripting invocations, which are common indicators of malicious activity following potential user execution.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
107
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution patterns in Linux environments, specifically targeting Node.js processes performing in-memory evaluation of code (often associated with fileless loaders) or the downloading of files with the .enc extension using common utilities like curl or wget, which may indicate C2 payload retrieval.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
102
Detects instances where the Windows Terminal application (or related processes like OpenConsole) spawns suspicious command-line utilities such as PowerShell, CMD, curl, or certutil with indicators of potential download activity or command-line obfuscation. This pattern is often indicative of interactive adversary activity attempting to stage tools or execute payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
902
Detects a multi-stage activity chain indicative of infostealer malware, including reading the browser 'Local State' file (containing the master key), accessing a browser process (likely for memory dumping or token extraction), and initiating an immediate outbound network connection to an external destination.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
002
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line patterns indicative of obfuscation or malicious intent, including encoded commands, Base64 decoding, IEX combined with common download cmdlets, and specific obfuscation techniques like backtick concatenation, character casting, or variable concatenation.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
4012
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