Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Exact-hash match for the known NeedyMantis first-stage loader sample masquerading as Poedit's WinSparkle.dll
Detects outbound HTTPS connections to major generative AI inference endpoints originating from non-browser, non-development tool processes at regular intervals. This activity is indicative of beaconing behavior, where malware (specifically families like LAMEHUG) leverages LLM APIs for dynamic command generation, payload obfuscation, or C2 instruction retrieval, bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects registry value modifications to the Windows Explorer RunMRU key where the data contains indicators of obfuscated PowerShell commands. This pattern is commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social-engineering campaign, where users are prompted to copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the presence of an embedded word-to-hex lookup table within a PE file. This technique is used by the Lorem Ipsum Loader to store shellcode as plaintext English words to evade entropy-based detection and static analysis tools. The rule matches a dense sequence of lowercase words frequently found in these malicious loaders.
Detects potential runtime polymorphic malware that modifies its own executable or script content while simultaneously communicating with generative AI or LLM API endpoints. This behavior indicates an adversary using LLMs to regenerate obfuscated code or mutate malware signatures dynamically at runtime.
Detects compiled LSASS credential-dumper binaries that clone the target process in a suspended state, patch ntdll/amsi/win32kbase hooking regions, and write an in-memory minidump, even when debug/console strings and process ancestry have been scrubbed to evade static and lineage detections
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at common LLM API endpoints (chat completions, model beta) that contain patterns indicative of LLM prompt injection or malicious code generation requests, such as commands for code obfuscation or payload regeneration, specifically where the User-Agent does not match standard browser strings and the request body contains base64 encoded instructions.
Detects known components of the Sauron malware, including MSI installers, side-loaded executables (rnpkeys.exe), and malicious DLLs (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) by matching known SHA-256 file hashes. It also includes a YARA rule for detecting PE binaries containing the string 'Sauron'.
Detects the embedded configuration structure within unpacked DLL samples associated with the Sauron loader, specifically targeting a fixed magic constant (0xbaadf00d) followed by a 0x40 flag byte.
Detects a multi-stage network communication pattern characteristic of agent sandbox evasion and subsequent data exfiltration. The rule first identifies an unusual volume of connections to URL-shorteners using encoded fragments in the URI, and subsequently flags calls to common screenshot or rendering services containing 'url=' parameters, suggesting possible pixel-based data exfiltration over a command and control channel.
TokenGrabber Builder: Nuitka/PyInstaller AV-Evasion Compilation - detects Python builder scripts compiling an embedded stealer.py payload into a native executable via Nuitka or PyInstaller with AV-evasion flags
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the '/sta' command-line flag and a GUID-formatted CLSID. This technique is often used by malware (e.g., DarkME RAT) to proxy execution through COM components, which hides the actual path of the loaded DLL or payload, aiding in evasion.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands (e.g., -EncodedCommand or -enc) combined with common download cradle indicators such as IEX, Net.WebClient, or DownloadString. This combination is highly indicative of fileless malware execution, initial access payload staging, or defense evasion techniques often employed by threat actors to bypass command-line monitoring.
Detects execution of PowerShell or Python scripts characterized by common patterns found in AI-generated code, including specific obfuscation techniques (base64, string manipulation), boilerplate error handling structures, verbose comments, and generic variable naming conventions. High scores indicate a higher probability of automated or obfuscated script execution.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags (EncodedCommand, NoProfile, WindowStyle Hidden, ExecutionPolicy Bypass) combined with either potential Base64-encoded payloads or network-based download cradles (e.g., Invoke-Expression, WebClient).
Detects a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer / tampered libcef.dll sideload chain deploying the SectopRAT .NET RAT, requiring multiple corroborating indicators and a PE anomaly consistent with DLL sideloading rather than a single generic string
Detects HTTP GET requests to Cloudflare Pages subdomains (.pages.dev) ending in '/File_download', often used as a distribution point for malicious HTA (HTML Application) or WSF (Windows Script File) payloads in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects the UAT-11587 TestAssembly.dll downloader by its shared AssemblyAttribute GUID b2b3adb0-1669-4b94-86cb-6dd682ddbea3 embedded in .NET metadata across all campaign builds
Detects Antino backdoor binaries (slc.dll and standalone) via embedded AntinoApp application manifest string and Rust PDB path patterns matching GitHub Actions Windows runner structure.
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