Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
78 detections
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This rule identifies potential SparroWocky malware payload files by detecting a specific custom header (0x11328712 in both little-endian and big-endian format) used for identifying encrypted .dat files that contain embedded RC4 keys.
Detects components associated with the SparroWocky trident loader, specifically targeting side-loaded DLLs (DukeQt.dll or winfsp-x64.dll) and .dat data containers that contain a specific magic value (0x11328712) and RC4 strings, indicating in-memory payload decryption and mapping.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects Koktevrat Stage 2 Android RAT component (com.kowo.ciligeci) that unpacks the RC4-encrypted uoN.css/uoN.apk payload using the RC4 key iOZ
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects obfuscated PHP web shell activity within the Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin, specifically looking for common obfuscation patterns like base64_decode, gzinflate, and str_rot13 combined with encoded payloads.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
Detects Koktevrat Stage 2 Android RAT component (com.kowo.ciligeci) that unpacks the RC4-encrypted uoN.css/uoN.apk payload using the RC4 key iOZ
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects a hardcoded PEM RSA public key embedded alongside JSCeal-specific compiled V8 bytecode obfuscation artifacts, used to encrypt exfiltrated data or C2 communications
Detects a hardcoded PEM RSA public key embedded alongside JSCeal-specific compiled V8 bytecode obfuscation artifacts, used to encrypt exfiltrated data or C2 communications
Detects the StopAndProtect two-stage PowerShell chain: stage 1 downloads/executes stage 2, which reflectively loads a base64-encoded .NET assembly and invokes an Execute method.
Detects TWINLOOT PyArmor 9.2.5-protected implant components via known file hashes combined with expected filesize range and filename/extension pattern (bootstrap-fat.pyc, pyarmor_runtime.pyd, .pyarmor.ikey, embedded vendor ZIP) to reduce false positives from renamed unrelated files with coincidental hash context
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform reflective assembly loading of a payload that has been decrypted using AES and decompressed with GZip. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory while bypassing static file-based detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform reflective assembly loading of a payload that has been decrypted using AES and decompressed with GZip. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory while bypassing static file-based detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform reflective assembly loading of a payload that has been decrypted using AES and decompressed with GZip. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory while bypassing static file-based detection.
Form-grabbing and credential stealing malware-as-a-service
Detects execution of PowerShell commands associated with the Pay2Key ransomware, specifically searching for command lines that reference bin-staged payloads (data1.bin, data2.bin, data3.bin) and a hardcoded XOR key (12199) used to deobfuscate the payloads in memory before execution via Invoke-Expression or similar methods.
Photo-themed ZIP phishing campaign dropping a Node.js implant
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