Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths not typically associated with legitimate software. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.
Detects the loading of the 'user32.dll' library into a process named 'firefox.exe' where the process is either unsigned or executing from a suspicious location like 'ProgramData'. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of BabylonRAT, which masquerades as the Firefox browser to perform keylogging by hooking system APIs.
This rule detects instances of a process named 'firefox.exe' that is executing from a directory other than the standard 'Mozilla Firefox' program folders. When this masquerading process loads critical system DLLs like 'kernel32.dll' or 'ntdll.dll', it flags potential dynamic API resolution activity commonly associated with BabylonRAT and similar malware that attempts to hide its capabilities by resolving system functions at runtime.
Detects the execution of a process named 'firefox.exe' that is running from a path other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directory. This is a common technique used by malware to masquerade as a legitimate web browser.
This rule detects processes named 'firefox.exe' running from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious activity by using a legitimate browser process name.
This rule detects processes named 'firefox.exe' running from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious activity by using a legitimate browser process name.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla installation directories, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or ProgramData. Additionally, the rule validates if the binary is digitally signed by Mozilla. This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt, where an attacker runs a malicious executable disguised as Firefox.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla installation directories, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or ProgramData. Additionally, the rule validates if the binary is digitally signed by Mozilla. This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt, where an attacker runs a malicious executable disguised as Firefox.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox program directories, a technique used by BabylonRAT and other malware to masquerade as a legitimate browser application.
Detects files that are masquerading as Rich Text Format (RTF) documents but do not contain valid RTF magic bytes and instead contain embedded Portable Executable (PE) headers or DOS stubs. This behavior is indicative of malware delivery via file-type masquerading, often used in spearphishing campaigns by actors such as Kimsuky.
Detects the execution of a process named 'firefox.exe' from a directory other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation path ('C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox' or 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox'). This behavior is commonly associated with the BabylonRAT malware, which masquerades as the legitimate Firefox browser to hide its presence and facilitate initial infection.
Detects the execution of a process named 'firefox.exe' from a directory other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation path ('C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox' or 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox'). This behavior is commonly associated with the BabylonRAT malware, which masquerades as the legitimate Firefox browser to hide its presence and facilitate initial infection.
Detects the execution or creation of files masquerading as Mozilla Firefox components (e.g., firefox.exe) located within non-standard, suspicious directories under 'ProgramData'. The rule further refines these alerts by identifying instances where the file lacks a valid Mozilla digital signature or contains an incorrect company name in its metadata.
Detects instances where a process masquerading as Firefox (executing outside of legitimate program directories) attempts to modify the Windows 'hosts' file. This behavior is indicative of BabylonRAT or similar malware attempting to redirect network traffic to malicious domains by tampering with local DNS resolution.
Detects instances where a process masquerading as Firefox (executing outside of legitimate program directories) attempts to modify the Windows 'hosts' file. This behavior is indicative of BabylonRAT or similar malware attempting to redirect network traffic to malicious domains by tampering with local DNS resolution.
Detects the Iron Man System phishing kit via its HTTP fingerprint: a request-header rule (ETag/Server/Via combo) checked on the external server's response, and three request-side rules checking for the kit's hashed asset paths and favicon when an internal host requests them from an external site. Fixed a direction bug on the three request-side rules that had source/destination reversed (they previously required an external host to request the path from an internal server, which would rarely if ever fire).
This rule detects processes with names commonly associated with system daemons (e.g., kworker, fc-cache, chronyd, gvfsd) that are executing from non-standard, suspicious directories such as /tmp/ or user-defined hidden folders. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system processes to evade detection.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of unsigned executable files (.exe, .dll, .sys, .efi) within critical Windows system directories (System32, SysWOW64, drivers, boot). The rule excludes activity triggered by known trusted OS update processes, such as TrustedInstaller or Windows Update services, and optionally flags occurrences outside defined maintenance windows.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
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