Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
130 detections
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that masquerade as a 'Google Chrome Update' task but are initiated by suspicious processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or schtasks.exe, and do not originate from the legitimate Google Chrome installation directories.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Edge or OneDrive update tasks. This behavior is associated with APT36 (Transparent Tribe) and their use of modular malware to establish persistence.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names associated with Microsoft Edge updates, or the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize encoded arguments and known APT36 download cradles, indicating an attempt to establish persistence or retrieve secondary payloads.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is associated with the SparroWocky threat. The rule flags the service creation event (Event ID 7045) and identifies if the service description matches the known malicious signature, which attempts to masquerade as a legitimate auditing tool.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects the presence of an XMRig cryptocurrency miner masquerading as the systemd-logind process. The rule identifies processes named 'systemd-logind' that either reside in an incorrect file path ('/usr/sbin/systemd-logind') or utilize command-line arguments characteristic of XMRig mining activity. This behavior is associated with the CARBONATO botnet.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names associated with Microsoft Edge updates, or the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize encoded arguments and known APT36 download cradles, indicating an attempt to establish persistence or retrieve secondary payloads.
This rule monitors process creation events for suspicious activity, specifically detecting two patterns: 1) The creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive KeepAlive' using schtasks.exe, which is indicative of persistence mechanisms masquerading as legitimate software, and 2) Execution of the 'taskhostw.exe' binary with command-line arguments 'exec' and 'hide', which is a common indicator of the NirCmd utility being renamed and used for stealthy execution.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
Detects execution of processes masquerading as system threads (e.g., [kcached], [rcu_preempt]) that utilize the command-line flag 'exec -a' and include indicators associated with 'gs-dbus' or specific port configurations (GS_PORT=53). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated command-and-control or malicious persistence mechanisms that attempt to hide within common system process names.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects the HEAVYGRAM malware utilizing the Telegram Bot API to download file attachments, followed by the extraction of an archive using PowerShell to a masqueraded directory (C:\ProgramData\Kee_Pass), and the subsequent execution of a binary masquerading as KeePass.exe.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Google Chrome Update' using the Windows schtasks.exe utility. The rule flags instances where the task is created from locations other than the legitimate Google Chrome installation directories, identifying potential persistence mechanisms masquerading as a common software update process.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks that attempt to masquerade as legitimate Google Chrome Update tasks. It flags tasks that use the 'Google Chrome Update' name but do not follow the standard naming convention (which typically includes 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachine') or tasks that initiate suspicious actions using scripting engines (like PowerShell, cmd.exe, mshta, etc.) rather than the signed Google update binary.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
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