Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
693 detections
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Detects attempts by processes, such as Python or PyInstaller-compiled binaries, to perform in-memory patching of the 'EtwEventWrite' function within 'ntdll.dll'. This technique is used to bypass Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and suppress security telemetry, a tactic observed in campaigns like Glove Stealer.
Detects the execution of a PyInstaller-compiled payload associated with the Yuta/Glove Stealer campaign. The rule monitors for processes launching from temporary _MEI* extraction directories within %APPDATA% or %TEMP%, and specifically identifies the winupdate.exe payload within .cache subdirectories.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks at 1-minute intervals using 'schtasks.exe' that employ masqueraded names (e.g., MicrosoftUserInterface) or execute known suspicious payloads associated with the NarwhalRAT malware (e.g., python scripts or .cat files). This behavior is characteristic of persistence mechanisms used by APT37.
Detects execution of OneDriveUpdater.exe from C:\ProgramData, which may represent a masqueraded binary attempting to impersonate legitimate Microsoft software. This could indicate an attempt at defense evasion or persistence by an attacker.
This rule detects suspicious process creations where common system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, lsass.exe, winlogon.exe) act as parent processes for scripting or command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe) and the child process runs with a low or untrusted integrity level. This pattern can indicate process injection or other forms of malicious execution where an attacker attempts to hide their activity by masquerading as legitimate system processes.
Detects execution of a process named 'IntelAudioService.exe' located in a user-specific subdirectory under 'IntelAudio\Service\'. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to masquerade malicious activity by mimicking the naming convention of legitimate Intel audio drivers while executing from non-standard locations.
This rule detects various indicators of DLL sideloading and process masquerading often associated with threat actor campaigns such as OceanLotus (APT32) and other malicious installers (FireAnt MetaKit). It monitors for specific DLL loads by unsigned or unexpected processes, the execution of masqueraded binaries, and suspicious command-line patterns used to stage malicious payloads.
This rule detects instances where a process loads a DLL from suspicious, commonly user-writable directories (such as Temp, AppData, ProgramData, or Public). It filters for DLLs that lack standard file metadata (FileVersion/Description) or contain an OriginalFileName mismatch, which is often indicative of side-loading or malicious library injection. The rule further correlates this event with a network connection initiated by the same process to highlight potential C2 activity associated with the suspicious DLL load.
This rule detects instances where a process loads a DLL from suspicious, commonly user-writable directories (such as Temp, AppData, ProgramData, or Public). It filters for DLLs that lack standard file metadata (FileVersion/Description) or contain an OriginalFileName mismatch, which is often indicative of side-loading or malicious library injection. The rule further correlates this event with a network connection initiated by the same process to highlight potential C2 activity associated with the suspicious DLL load.
This rule detects unauthorized write, modification, or creation events on critical SSH binary files (sshd, ssh, scp) on Linux systems. It excludes legitimate package management tools (e.g., apt, yum, dpkg, rpm) from triggering alerts to reduce noise from system updates.
Detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by 'quick_share.exe', 'NearbyShare.exe', or 'nearby_sharing.exe' from suspicious directory paths such as User Temp, AppData, or Downloads folders. This behavior is highly indicative of DLL side-loading attempts where an adversary leverages a legitimate, known process to execute malicious code.
This rule detects potential Remote Access Trojan (RAT) activity by identifying specific indicators associated with Nuitka-compiled binaries, specifically the 'chost.exe' filename or paths containing 'win-driver-xd7d'. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious Python-based loader executions ('loader.py') initiated from temporary directories, which is a common persistence or execution technique for such malware.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
This rule detects potential malicious activity involving the 'wusvc.exe' executable. It flags instances where 'wusvc.exe' is executed from the user's Downloads folder or other non-standard paths, particularly when the file size is abnormally small (less than 100KB), which is indicative of masquerading or a dropper payload. The rule also checks for a known malicious file hash associated with the Snowlight dropper.
This rule detects the execution of 'vaultsvc.exe' or executables starting with 'WindowsVault' and ending with '.exe' from suspicious, non-standard directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp. It also flags execution from any non-system path if not in System32, SysWOW64, or Program Files. A known malicious hash for 'vaultsvc.exe' is specifically identified.
Detects email thread fabrication by the Latin-placeholder phishing kit, which embeds specific, non-business job titles and recipient-domain email addresses into the message body to manufacture the appearance of legitimate internal correspondence.
Detects the execution of 'HFY.exe', which serves as the dropper for the BeepRAT malware. This dropper is typically distributed within a trojanized archive containing legitimate-looking DLLs, such as 'data.dll' (a disguised SQLite database), 'EPPlus.dll', and 'NPOI.dll'. The rule triggers when 'HFY.exe' is executed outside of standard program installation directories.
Detects a browser creating a ZIP archive whose name impersonates a GPU, disk, temperature, codec, or PDF utility associated with high-performance systems. This activity is often associated with poisoned search results leading to cryptojacking campaigns.
Detects the execution of the VNT tunneling tool disguised as a legitimate VMware executable (vmwared.exe) located in C:\ProgramData\VMware\. The rule also identifies the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' configured to execute the masqueraded binary at user logon with elevated privileges.
Detects processes using prctl with PR_SET_NAME to rename themselves to systemd-userdbd, a technique used by the MYRA RAT (Operation Friday Harvest) to masquerade as a legitimate system daemon and evade process-tree inspection. The rule looks for processes with 'systemd-userdbd' in their product name or in specific suspicious folders, or processes named 'systemd-userdbd' initiated by 'node' or 'npm'. It also identifies process name changes or modifications to process primary tokens that include 'systemd-userdbd'.
Detects indicators of execution related to a known NPM Remote Access Trojan (RAT), including masquerading via chost.exe, execution from specific temporary directories used by the malware, and Python scripts executing a loader.py file from temporary locations.
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