Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
693 detections
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Detects indicators of execution related to a known NPM Remote Access Trojan (RAT), including masquerading via chost.exe, execution from specific temporary directories used by the malware, and Python scripts executing a loader.py file from temporary locations.
This rule identifies the execution or presence of a specific malicious installer executable (MD5 87603EA025623B19954E460ADD532048) that is known to be reused and renamed across multiple campaigns to masquerade as legitimate software installers.
Detects instances where a process named 'install.exe' loads a DLL named 'install.res.1033.dll' from the same directory. This pattern is often associated with software installers or potential masquerading attempts where malicious payloads utilize specific resource DLL naming conventions.
Detects the execution or creation of files named GT_NET.exe or Gt_net.exe, which are associated with the Grixba ransomware (Play Ransomware group). The rule also identifies files that masquerade as SentinelOne by utilizing SentinelOne-related product, company, or description metadata but are located outside of the legitimate SentinelOne installation directory.
Detects the creation or loading of specific DLL files identified as part of the Turla STOCKSTAY malware framework. The rule monitors both file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) and process image loads to identify indicators of this specific campaign.
Detects core Windows system processes (svchost.exe, lsass.exe, csrss.exe, winlogon.exe) executing from non-standard locations other than System32 or SysWOW64. This is a common indicator of process masquerading, where malicious actors rename or move their executable to blend in with legitimate system activity.
Detects the execution of known critical system processes (e.g., svchost.exe, lsass.exe) from directories other than the standard Windows System32 or SysWOW64 paths. This behavior is indicative of masquerading, where an adversary attempts to evade detection by naming malicious files after legitimate system binaries.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload. This rule correlates two distinct process events: a wscript.exe initiated cmd.exe process executing 'tar -xf dll.zip', followed by a 'chost.exe' process executing 'loader.py' on the same device and account within a 5-minute window.
Detects various post-exploitation activities associated with the Amadey loader, including the execution of its persistence mechanism (nudwee.exe), dropping and executing secondary payloads in temporary directories, using PowerShell download cradles, creating scheduled tasks for persistence, and silent MSI installations. This rule aims to identify the delivery of secondary payloads like StealC and Lumma Stealer.
Detects instances where SystemSettings.exe is spawned from non-standard directories often associated with the SharkLoader malware family, such as AppData roaming subdirectories or KasperskyLab program folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading and malicious staging.
Detects the execution of suspected StrikeShark-related binaries (SystemSettings.exe and FScan) when they are found running from non-standard directories or masquerading as legitimate system processes. The rule specifically monitors for instances where these binaries are executed from user-writable paths like AppData or Temp, while excluding legitimate Windows paths and processes associated with Windows Update.
This rule monitors process creation events (Sysmon Event ID 1) to identify suspicious executables that masquerade as common software updaters (GoogleUpdateStepup, AnyConnect, AutoUpdate) or attempt to run the Windows SystemSettings.exe binary from non-standard directories. It further flags these instances when they are launched with specific command-line indicators such as cmd.exe or PDF file paths, which are common patterns for droppers or malicious execution chains.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task used by NarwhalRAT for persistence, using a specific task name and execution pattern.
This rule detects the creation and execution of scheduled tasks used by StrikeShark's SharkLoader, often associated with Cobalt Strike, for persistence. It identifies suspicious scheduled task names that mimic legitimate Microsoft services (e.g., OneDrive, MicrosoftUpdate) and the execution of 'SystemSettings.exe' from unusual 'AppData' subdirectories ('xwreg' or 'xgdf'). The rule has three branches: detecting 'schtasks.exe' command-line usage to create such tasks, detecting 'ScheduledTaskCreated' events with the suspicious names or command patterns, and detecting 'SystemSettings.exe' execution from the specific 'AppData' subdirectories.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload.
This rule detects the creation of Electron application runtime files (electron.exe, app.asar, index.js, package.json) by installers like UtilifySetup or Inno Setup in unusual or suspicious AppData\Local subdirectories. This behavior is associated with the Ghost ClickFix attack chain, where compromised systems are used to deploy malicious Electron applications. The rule specifically looks for file creations in paths matching `\appdata\local\(super|max|util)[^\\]*` and installer executables named `utilifysetup.exe`, `setup.exe`, or `is-[a-z0-9]+\.exe`.
Detects wermgr.exe masquerading outside legitimate system directories, associated with the Nightmare Eclipse exploit chain.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
This rule detects common security product executables (MsMpEng.exe, SenseNdr.exe, csfalconservice.exe, CylanceSvc.exe) that are running from file paths inconsistent with their legitimate installation directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade as trusted security software to evade detection or achieve persistence.
Stealthy backdoor MLTBackdoor linked to KongTuke ClickFix and ModeloRAT campaigns
Detects the RoguePlanet quarantine artifact hijack technique, which involves two primary signals: the staging of 'wermgr.exe' within temporary 'RP_*' working directories and the unauthorized creation or modification of 'wermgr.exe' in 'C:\Windows\System32' by processes other than trusted Windows system components.
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