Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
667 detections
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Detects network traffic indicative of VelvetCake malware exfiltrating data. The rule specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests to 'logout.php' containing 'OKey' and 'Who' parameters, using a user agent string that includes 'WebClient', which is often associated with PowerShell-based network requests.
This rule detects potentially malicious C2 communication by monitoring high-frequency HTTP POST requests from the 'rnpkeys.exe' process. It aggregates network events over 30-second windows and flags activity exceeding a threshold of 5 POST requests directed at known suspicious domains or specific high-port network destinations, which is characteristic of beaconing or data exfiltration activity.
Detects a multi-stage network communication pattern characteristic of agent sandbox evasion and subsequent data exfiltration. The rule first identifies an unusual volume of connections to URL-shorteners using encoded fragments in the URI, and subsequently flags calls to common screenshot or rendering services containing 'url=' parameters, suggesting possible pixel-based data exfiltration over a command and control channel.
Detects Node.js processes establishing network connections to common webhook relay and collection services, which may indicate data exfiltration or credential theft.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects outbound network connections to known SectopRAT C2 infrastructure, specifically targeting the hardcoded IP 98.142.252.140 or the non-standard port 15847 often used for encrypted exfiltration.
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
Detects HTTP POST requests containing potential credential exfiltration indicators, specifically targeting the '/google.php' endpoint with 'do=login&', 'user=', and 'pass=' parameters. This pattern is associated with FlowerStorm (Storm-1167) AiTM phishing kits.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a URI path '/google.php' containing suspicious parameters 'do=login&user=' and '&pass='. This pattern is indicative of credential exfiltration activities commonly associated with the FlowerStorm campaign.
Detects PowerShell execution that combines screen capturing capabilities (System.Drawing.Bitmap, Windows.Forms) with network communication (System.Net.WebClient) directed towards known C2 domains (medianewsonline.com) using specific exfiltration parameters (OKey, Who).
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency outbound HTTPS POST requests from the 'rnpkeys.exe' process, characteristic of the Sauron Loader exfiltrating screenshot chunks (Message Type 3) to a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at the '/api/credentials' URI, a pattern associated with AMOS Stealer credential exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple requests occur from a single source within a short timeframe.
Detects network traffic associated with the RisePro malware family, specifically identifying the use of 'serversendfile' commands, which indicates data exfiltration or file transfer activity via a command-and-control channel.
Detects unauthorized outbound network traffic from browser processes to the lookalike domain 'pdf.gusercontent.com'. This domain is associated with a malicious Firefox browser extension, 'PDF Identity Verifier', which is designed to exfiltrate session telemetry and data from Google account sessions.
Detects a specific command and control (C2) communication pattern characteristic of RatHat malware, involving the retrieval of HTML overlay templates followed by the submission of captured form or credential data from the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware used by North Korean threat actors Konni and Kimsuky. These signatures identify beaconing behavior to known free-hosting infrastructure, specifically monitoring for unique URL parameters ('OKey=', 'Who=', 'Areyou=cake') and common file naming conventions associated with the C2 communication.
This rule set detects network communication patterns associated with the AnonyMousKIT phishing kit, specifically targeting the exfiltration of captured user credentials to the Telegram Bot API and communication with known phishing panel infrastructure. It monitors for DNS lookups of 'anomkit.shop', established TCP connections to the associated backend relay, and HTTP requests containing specific credential-related keywords directed towards the Telegram API.
Detects unauthorized export and outbound exfiltration of MikroTik RouterOS .rif diagnostic files. These files contain sensitive device configuration data and are often targeted during the final stage of the 'MikroTrick' attack chain, following administrative credential compromise.
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