Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
774 detections
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This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts using DCOM-based WMI calls to the remote OXID Resolver on port 135. Attackers often abuse DCOM to remotely trigger WMI methods, enabling remote code execution, discovery, or other malicious activities. The rule triggers on the characteristic DCOM OXID Resolve packet structure associated with this activity.
This rule detects network activity associated with lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It specifically looks for a DCE/RPC Bind request that targets the IWbemServices interface UUID, a common method for initializing remote WMI connections to execute commands on remote systems.
This rule detects a specific environmental keying pattern indicative of malware or reconnaissance tools attempting to identify hostnames and domain membership. It monitors for a sequence of activities occurring within a 30-second window: querying the registry for computer name configuration, executing a WMI query for system information, and querying environment variables. The detection further filters for processes that exhibit this behavior without subsequent network activity or child process creation, which is characteristic of 'silent' environmental keying techniques.
Detects multiple concurrent attempts to inhibit Windows system recovery, a common behavior observed in the TrymeLocker ransomware family. The rule triggers when at least two distinct malicious activities occur on the same host within a 120-second window, including the disabling of the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) via bcdedit, deletion of shadow copies via vssadmin or wmic, disabling of the Windows backup service (wbengine) via sc, or disabling of System Restore via registry modification.
Detects malicious node.exe processes engaging in system, user, process, or network discovery behaviors. This behavior is indicative of malicious npm packages, such as those seen in the Polymarket Trap, Miasma, or MYRA campaigns, which perform reconnaissance before attempting credential exfiltration.
Detects suspicious execution of wmic.exe where the command line contains keywords often associated with enumeration or manipulation of processes and services. This can indicate an adversary using WMI for discovery or execution.
This rule detects when the WMI provider host process (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common scripting interpreters or command-line shells such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is a common indicator of remote command execution via WMI, often used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence within a Windows environment.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSE.exe) spawns common interactive shells, scripting interpreters, or other binaries typically associated with remote command execution. This pattern is a strong indicator of WMI being abused for lateral movement or remote code execution within a Windows environment.
Detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions (Path, Extension, or Process) via WMIC or PowerShell, followed by a file creation event within a suspicious directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData) within 15 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass antivirus detection for malicious payloads.
Detects anomalous use of WMI queries or the wmic.exe utility to gather system or antivirus configuration information from suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or when executed by unexpected processes. This pattern often indicates early-stage discovery by malicious software.
Detects the use of administrative utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, and wbadmin.exe to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware attempting to inhibit system recovery prior to encryption.
This rule monitors for known malicious activities associated with a specific Go-based backdoor. It detects network connections to a known command-and-control IP (81.177.215.15) on port 9443, as well as host-based behaviors including suspicious WMI-based system information discovery and the execution of cmd.exe spawned by a specific suspicious process named MediumInstStart.exe.
Correlates the use of Impacket scripts (wmiexec.py or smbexec.py compiled variants) executing remote commands via WMI or SMB services on target endpoints. Specifically looks for 'wmiprvse.exe' or 'services.exe' initiating 'cmd.exe' or 'powershell.exe' with command-line arguments indicating local host or administrative share access and redirection to a temporary directory.
Detects evidence of common Impacket tool execution (e.g., psexec, wmiexec, smbexec, ntlmrelayx), unauthorized access to sensitive SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$), creation of suspicious services often used for remote execution, and lateral movement via NTLM network logons.
Detects the STOCKSTAY/STOCKTRADER backdoor performing system discovery via WMI queries (Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, or Win32_ComputerSystem). The detection identifies suspicious WMI activity originating from or associated with processes named after known Turla StockMarket components.
Detects anomalous activity where multiple distinct Living-off-the-Land (LotL) binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, systeminfo.exe) are executed on the same device within a single hour. This threshold of 4 unique administrative or discovery tools being used in a short timeframe is often indicative of reconnaissance, lateral movement, or post-exploitation environment assessment by an adversary.
This rule detects the use of wmic.exe to execute commands or manage remote systems, specifically flagging indicators of lateral movement, credential usage, or command execution like 'node', 'user', 'password', and 'call create'.
Detects the execution of psql.exe with arguments pointing to a VeeamBackup database, or suspicious database queries containing 'credentials' or 'SELECT' statements. The rule specifically alerts when this behavior is initiated by PowerShell or WMI processes, which are common indicators of automated post-exploitation activities intended to extract sensitive information from the backup infrastructure.
Detects the execution of known Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin) used to delete Volume Shadow Copies or the backup catalog, a common technique employed by ransomware to prevent system recovery. It also detects processes named locker.exe, commonly associated with ransomware binaries.
Detects suspicious usage of remote execution tools like PsExec, WMIC, and PowerShell, which are commonly used for lateral movement by adversaries. The rule identifies instances where these tools are executed multiple times within a short period (more than 2 times in 5 minutes) from non-system accounts and outside of standard system directories, indicating potential malicious activity.
Detects suspicious WMI queries to the SecurityCenter2 namespace for security product information (AntiVirusProduct, AntiSpywareProduct, FirewallProduct) originating from common web browsers or document editors. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan attempting to identify and evade security software.
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