Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: CVE-2024-26234 and CVE-2024-29988
This analytic detects the use of `New-CIMSession` followed by `Invoke-CIMMethod` within PowerShell. This combination is significant because it mimics the behavior of `Invoke-WMIMethod`, which is often used for remote code execution, particularly via NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these cmdlets in the `ScriptBlockText` field. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized remote command execution and system control.
This analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-WMIExec utility within PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). This detection leverages PowerShell script block logs to identify instances where the Invoke-WMIExec command is used. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential lateral movement using WMI commands with NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely on target systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.
The analytic detects the use of the Win32_ScheduledJob WMI class via PowerShell script block logging. This class, which manages scheduled tasks, is disabled by default due to security concerns and must be explicitly enabled through registry modifications. The detection leverages PowerShell event code 4104 and script block text analysis. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate malicious intent, especially if the class was enabled by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment by creating scheduled tasks.
This analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs an event query to list running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture and analyze script block text for specific WMI queries. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware and APT actors to map security applications or services on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify and potentially disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `DS_Group` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages WMI to query all domain groups. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for domain group enumeration, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, potentially leading to further exploitation and privilege escalation within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with parameters used to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies specific script block text patterns associated with remote process instantiation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_Computer` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify queries targeting domain computers using WMI. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for Active Directory Discovery and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain computers, facilitating further attacks such as lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool
Detects WMI modules being loaded by an uncommon process
Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework
Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE
Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Which could be a sign of lateral movement via WMI.
Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Detects potential SquiblyTwo attack technique with possible renamed WMIC via Imphash and OriginalFileName fields
Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
Excel called wmic to finally proxy execute regsvr32 with the payload.
An attacker wanted to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
But we have command-line in the event which allow us to "restore" this suspicious parent-child chain and detect it.
Monitor process creation with "wmic process call create" and LOLBins in command-line with parent Office application processes.
An attacker wanted to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
But we have command-line in the event which allow us to "restore" this suspicious parent-child chain and detect it.
Monitor process creation with "wmic process call create" and LOLBins in command-line with parent Office application processes.
This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
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