Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
774 detections
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Detects the execution of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit used to delete volume shadow copies, the backup catalog, or disable system recovery boot policies. This activity is a common precursor to ransomware encryption to prevent data restoration.
Correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within 90 minutes: LSASS memory access consistent with credential dumping, followed by remote service or WMI-based lateral movement, and finishing with mass file renames or modifications characteristic of ransomware encryption.
Detects instances where the WMI service (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common command-line or system tools such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe. This behavior is often indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WMI.
This rule monitors for process creation events where the parent process is identified as the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) or the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (wmic.exe) tool, executing a Win32_Process creation command. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for remote execution and lateral movement.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin, and bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware operations to inhibit data restoration.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying the execution of PsExec service components or common lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMIC, CMD) interacting with Windows administrative shares (via UNC paths or specific network ports 135, 139, 445). It specifically looks for process creation events associated with these tools and network activity indicative of remote administration. Legitimate administrative tools signed by Microsoft or known management software (SolarWinds, Tanium, Ivanti, IBM BigFix) are explicitly excluded.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects attempts by malicious software to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with deletion flags or wmic.exe with shadowcopy deletion commands combined with non-interactive flags, which are common indicators of ransomware preparation.
The FileFix StealC campaign's final-stage loader is written in Go and performs VM/sandbox checks plus string encryption before executing the infostealer.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to inhibit system recovery by deleting shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disabling automatic recovery features. This behavior is commonly observed in ransomware attacks.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, clear backup catalogs, or disable system recovery features, which is a common behavior of ransomware before encrypting files.
Detects attempts by malicious software to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with deletion flags or wmic.exe with shadowcopy deletion commands combined with non-interactive flags, which are common indicators of ransomware preparation.
Detects the WMI provider host (wmiprvse.exe) spawning common living-off-the-land binaries often associated with command execution or lateral movement.
Detects the use of native Windows binaries such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, bcdedit.exe, and wbadmin.exe to inhibit system recovery by deleting shadow copies, clearing backup catalogs, or disabling automatic system recovery.
Detects suspicious activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting cryptocurrency wallet data files. The rule correlates file access to known wallet data paths by a hollowed process 'clspack.exe', followed by suspicious outbound network activity originating from that same process, and potentially preceded by WMI-based antivirus enumeration.
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