Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
774 detections
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Detects the abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute processes via wmic.exe or WmiPrvSE.exe, often combined with obfuscated command-line arguments such as encoded PowerShell or CMD commands.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes within 120 seconds of a Type 3 (Network) logon event. This behavior is a common indicator of remote command execution, frequently used by lateral movement tools like Impacket's wmiexec or similar WMI-based remote execution frameworks.
Detects lateral movement techniques leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). The rule identifies instances where the WMI provider host, WmiPrvSE.exe, spawns common administrative or interactive shell tools (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This pattern is consistent with the abuse of Win32_Process.Create() via WMI/DCOM/RPC for remote command execution, a method frequently utilized by frameworks like Impacket (wmiexec.py) for fileless, agentless lateral movement.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe, which are correlated with inbound network connections on ports 135 (RPC/DCOM) or 445 (SMB). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques used by tools like Impacket's wmiexec.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or powershell_ise.exe by the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe). This pattern is frequently used for fileless lateral movement, as threat actors leverage WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute remote commands which manifests as wmiprvse.exe launching a shell on the target host.
Detects coordinated activity indicative of destructive malware propagation similar to NotPetya. The rule identifies a three-stage sequence on a single host: execution of a DLL via rundll32.exe, followed by file writes to administrative network shares (C$/ADMIN$), and remote process creation via WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe), correlated with a high volume of SMB connections.
Detects potential abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for process execution. It monitors for wmic.exe creating processes, PowerShell cmdlets Invoke-WmiMethod or Invoke-CimMethod used for remote execution, and unexpected process spawns from the WmiPrvSE.exe provider service, which are common indicators of lateral movement and remote command execution.
This rule detects potential lateral movement via WMI by identifying two distinct suspicious behaviors: WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unexpected child processes (excluding common legitimate processes) or the usage of wmic.exe and PowerShell cmdlets (Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod) to execute processes on remote systems, as indicated by command line arguments specifying target nodes or computer names.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for lateral movement and remote code execution. The rule monitors for common WMI exploitation vectors, including the use of wmic.exe for process creation, PowerShell or C# invocations of WMI/CIM methods (such as Win32_Process Create), WMI event subscription registration for persistence, and the execution of mofcomp.exe.
Detects the use of native Windows administration utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery configurations. The rule specifically monitors for patterns where these commands are executed across multiple hosts or in rapid succession by the same account, behavior frequently observed during the precursor stages of ransomware deployment, such as the ShinyHunters ShinySp1d3r campaign.
This rule detects the execution of common Windows administration utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) being used to delete Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration data to disable automatic recovery. These actions are frequently performed by ransomware to prevent data restoration.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
This rule detects potential data staging activity associated with the REMUS malware. It correlates Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries for antivirus information (e.g., 'AntiVirusProduct', 'WbemLocator') with subsequent file creation events in non-standard directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary preparing or staging system profile data for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) loading WMI-related modules (wbemprox.dll, wbemcomn.dll, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of scripts attempting to query WMI for system information, environment configuration, or locale data, which is a common reconnaissance technique used by malware to identify the victim environment.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin) or PowerShell cmdlets to delete Volume Shadow Copies or backup catalogs. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware attempts to prevent system recovery.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to initiate process creation on remote hosts. This is achieved by combining the '/node:' flag (to specify a remote target) with the 'process call create' command. This technique is frequently utilized by adversaries and ransomware operators for lateral movement across a Windows network.
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