Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects use of scheduled tasks to break process trees and hide parent relationships
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'WindowsVaultSyncService' either through the 'schtasks.exe' command-line utility or via 'ScheduledTaskCreated' device events. This specific task name, combined with a potentially misleading description, could indicate malicious activity attempting to establish persistence or execute code.
Detects AT job creation via SMB for remote scheduled execution
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of network connections indicative of information stealer activity, specifically targeting behaviors observed with malware like VVS Stealer. It identifies instances where a non-browser process, originating from common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads, Users\Public), first connects to an external IP discovery service (ipify.org) and then subsequently communicates with Discord services (discord.com or discordapp.com) within a ten-minute window. This pattern suggests that malware is collecting the victim's public IP address before exfiltrating stolen data (e.g., account or browser information) to Discord infrastructure, often used as a command and control or data exfiltration channel by stealers.
Detects a persistence script querying for a missing task or payload and recreating it when absent, indicating self-repair behaviour. This rule specifically looks for command-line activity involving 'powershell', 'cmd', or 'schtasks.exe' that queries for scheduled tasks and then attempts to create or register them, often using keywords like 'if', 'missing', 'not found', 'create', or 'Register-ScheduledTask'.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks.json files containing the folderOpen trigger by non-editor processes. This technique can be abused to achieve automatic code execution when a project folder is opened, a method known to be used by malicious npm packages to execute payloads disguised as benign files.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks or 'at' jobs initiated by VBScript engines (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as persistence mechanisms established by malware or phishing attacks that leverage VBScript to schedule future execution.
Detects the installation of the Kazuar backdoor, indicated by the creation of a scheduled task or service, following initial access via stolen credentials. This detection correlates suspicious persistence mechanisms with a remote session login on a host previously identified with StealC activity, suggesting a multi-stage attack where initial compromise (StealC) leads to credential theft, followed by remote access and persistence (Kazuar).
Detects a persistence script querying for a missing task or payload and recreating it when absent, indicating self-repair behaviour. This rule specifically looks for command-line activity involving 'powershell', 'cmd', or 'schtasks.exe' that queries for scheduled tasks and then attempts to create or register them, often using keywords like 'if', 'missing', 'not found', 'create', or 'Register-ScheduledTask'.
Detects the execution of a scheduled task named OneDriveHealth invoking taskkill on explorer.exe to trigger a hijacked COM object. This rule specifically looks for 'svchost.exe' as the initiating process, executing 'taskkill' with 'explorer.exe' in its command line, which is indicative of a specific attack chain involving scheduled tasks and process termination.
Detects schtasks creating a one-time task on another host using supplied credentials and a batch file under Windows Temp, executed as SYSTEM. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or lateral movement by scheduling malicious code to run with high privileges on a remote system.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks' with 'SYSTEM' privileges, masquerading as Adobe or OneDrive, and pointing to an executable in a user-writable path (Temp, AppData, ProgramData, or Users\Public). This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects piping 'echo' directly into 'crontab -' to install cron jobs non-interactively, a standard method for scripted persistence.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks or 'at' jobs initiated by VBScript engines (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as persistence mechanisms established by malware or phishing attacks that leverage VBScript to schedule future execution.
Udm Mail Task Masquerade
YARA-L
Targets a scheduled task with trusted vendor wording whose action points to Temp, AppData, Public, or ProgramData. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Identifies the creation or execution of a 'VirtualSmokestGuy' scheduled task, which is associated with CastleRAT for persistence. The rule specifically looks for command-line activity containing 'VirtualSmokestGuy' and excludes specific numerical strings to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities post-compromise by monitoring process creation events (EventID 4688, 4689) for common administrative tools like PsExec, WMIC, and commands related to scheduled tasks. It specifically looks for these tools being used to execute commands on multiple target computers from a single initiating account within a short timeframe (2 hours), indicating an adversary attempting to move across the network.
Udm Mail Task Masquerade
YARA-L
Targets a scheduled task with trusted vendor wording whose action points to Temp, AppData, Public, or ProgramData. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Detects if the backdoor file 'install-persistent.php' is scheduled for persistence via cron or Windows scheduled tasks. This indicates a potential supply chain compromise targeting ShapedPlugin.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'AlphaSecurity' using schtasks.exe with the '/create' command-line argument. This specific task name and creation method have been associated with the Broomstick backdoor, which is used by the Rhysida ransomware group for persistence.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities post-compromise by monitoring process creation events (EventID 4688, 4689) for common administrative tools like PsExec, WMIC, and commands related to scheduled tasks. It specifically looks for these tools being used to execute commands on multiple target computers from a single initiating account within a short timeframe (2 hours), indicating an adversary attempting to move across the network.
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