Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Event ID 4697) where the command line contains either 'System' or 'Admin'. This could indicate an attempt to create a scheduled task that runs with elevated privileges or impersonates system/admin accounts for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule generates a comprehensive forensic timeline for a specific executable file, analyzing its origin (file creation/drops), execution context (process creation and child processes), network communications (outbound connections), and persistence mechanisms (registry modifications for run keys/startup and scheduled task creation/updates). It correlates events across different data sources based on the executable's file name or SHA256 hash.
This rule detects the creation of remote scheduled tasks over SMB by looking for the string "schtasks" in TCP traffic destined for port 445 (SMB). This activity is often associated with persistence techniques where attackers establish scheduled tasks on remote systems.
Remote AT Scheduled Job Creation
Suricata
This rule detects attempts to create scheduled jobs remotely using the 'atsvc' service, typically associated with the Windows Task Scheduler. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the string 'atsvc' in an established flow to the home network. This activity can be indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or executing code remotely.
Matanbuchus 3.0 Scheduled Task Creation
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Update Tracker Task' using either 'schtasks.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets ('Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask'). This specific task name has been associated with the Matanbuchus 3.0 loader.
Matanbuchus 3.0 Scheduled Task Creation
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Update Tracker Task' using either 'schtasks.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets ('Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask'). This specific task name has been associated with matanbuchus 3.0 loader.
Matanbuchus 3.0 Scheduled Task Creation
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Update Tracker Task' using either 'schtasks.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets ('Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask'). This specific task name has been associated with the Matanbuchus 3.0 loader.
This rule detects the execution of SUID binaries by a non-root user, immediately followed by the creation of a persistence mechanism such as a systemd service file or a cron job. This correlation aims to identify potential privilege escalation attempts where an attacker uses an SUID binary to gain elevated privileges and then establishes persistence on the system.
Detects the execution of the `crontab` binary by common web server service accounts on Linux systems. This activity is highly suspicious as it indicates an attacker leveraging remote code execution (RCE) in a web application to establish persistence via scheduled tasks.
Detects the creation of cron files in Cron directories, which could indicate potential persistence mechanisms being established by an attacker.
Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system administration activities and software installations may also create cron files.
This detection should be investigated in context, considering factors such as the user creating the file, the timing of creation, and the contents of the cron job.
Focus investigation on unexpected cron files created by non-administrative users or during suspicious timeframes.
Additionally, it is recommended to review the contents of the newly created cron files to assess their intent.
Furthermore, it is suggested to baseline normal cron file creation and apply additional filters to reduce false positives based on the specific environment.
Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system administration activities and software installations may also create cron files.
This detection should be investigated in context, considering factors such as the user creating the file, the timing of creation, and the contents of the cron job.
Focus investigation on unexpected cron files created by non-administrative users or during suspicious timeframes.
Additionally, it is recommended to review the contents of the newly created cron files to assess their intent.
Furthermore, it is suggested to baseline normal cron file creation and apply additional filters to reduce false positives based on the specific environment.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
Detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the task is configured to run under 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' or 'NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE' (represented as 'SYSTEM' or 'NT AUT' in the command line), but the initiating process is not a standard system process. This can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or elevate privileges.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks on remote systems using the 'schtasks.exe' utility. Specifically, it looks for instances where a scheduled task is created with high-privilege accounts such as 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', or 'NT AUTHORITY'. The detection logic requires the presence of '/create', '/s' (specifying a remote system), '/tr' (task run), '/tn' (task name), and '/ru' (run as user) flags in the command line. It explicitly filters out tasks created on the local machine (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1). This activity is indicative of potential lateral movement or privilege escalation, as adversaries often use remote scheduled tasks to establish persistence or execute commands on other systems within a network with elevated privileges.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the `schtasks.exe` utility with specific parameters indicating elevated privileges. Specifically, it looks for tasks created with the `/create` command, running under the `SYSTEM` user account (`/ru SYSTEM`), and with the highest privilege level (`/rl HIGHEST`). This combination of parameters is often leveraged by adversaries for defense evasion, persistence, and privilege escalation by ensuring the scheduled task executes with maximum system privileges.
The rule detects the execution and persistence mechanisms of the HoneyMyte CoolClient backdoor. It identifies specific command-line arguments used during execution (' install', ' work', ' passuac') when launched by particular parent processes (Sang.exe or Jarte.exe). It also looks for the creation of 'write.exe' as a child process originating from common data directories (ProgramData, AppData, Temp). Additionally, the rule identifies persistence mechanisms by searching for command lines related to 'media_updaten' (likely a service) or 'ComboxResetTask' (likely a scheduled task).
Detects storage of a PowerShell-based persistent payload in the Windows registry under a non-standard GUID-based key using the Corel value. This technique is used by the final stage of the eScan supply-chain attack to establish stealthy persistence after environment validation.
This rule detects suspicious scheduled tasks that execute binaries from the AppData\Local folder, which is a common location for user-specific applications and can be abused by adversaries for persistence. Such behavior is often used by Infostealer Malware. The rule specifically looks for processes initiated by 'svchost.exe' or 'taskeng.exe' with command lines indicating scheduled task execution, and then filters out a whitelist of known legitimate applications that operate from this directory. It also incorporates a global prevalence check to further reduce false positives.
Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Register-ScheduledTask' within an HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a compromised system by creating a scheduled task, potentially delivered via a web-based command and control channel or a malicious download.
Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
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