Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,216 detections
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Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftMusicLibrariesPackageTaskMachine' and the invocation of specific associated file names 'codeflush.exe' or 'settingenv.cat', which are indicators of persistence used by the threat actor APT37.
Detects the execution of the Chisel C2 tool by matching its unique command-line grammar, specifically the 'client' subcommand combined with reverse remote ('R:') configurations. This detection strategy is resilient against binary renaming and infrastructure rotation by focusing on the tool's required argument structure rather than static IOCs like filenames or C2 addresses. It is specifically useful for identifying unauthorized remote tunnels used for persistence and data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that reference specific task names associated with potentially suspicious activity or persistence (e.g., PlutonAgentScheduler, EnterpriseMgmtServicesScheduler). The rule specifically looks for tasks being placed or modified within 'microsoft' or 'pluton' directories or paths, which may indicate an attempt to masquerade as legitimate system services.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by command shells where the task command points to files residing in non-standard or user-writable directories such as \Users\Public\, \PerfLogs\, or \ProgramData\. This pattern is frequently utilized by malware loaders like SocGholish, GootLoader, and various ransomware strains to achieve persistence following initial compromise.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the task name is 'MultiUpdater' and the task definition is imported from a file with a specific naming convention and extension (mgk, tmp, or xml) in the root directory.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that are configured to run every minute, specifically targeting command lines associated with known suspicious processes like 'codeflush.exe' or potentially masqueraded music library tasks.
Detects signs of malicious activity involving specific files (StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1, ComponentTask33Agent) and behaviors, including PowerShell execution, scheduled task creation, script execution via wscript, and registry run key modification. These behaviors are indicative of persistence mechanisms and potentially suspicious command execution.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to run under SYSTEM or a Service account, where the triggering process is not a recognized system binary (e.g., taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe). This pattern is often used for persistence or lateral movement by bypassing standard administrative task creation tools.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive KeepAlive' or a task set to execute every 5 minutes, in conjunction with the execution of 'taskhostw.exe' containing 'exec hide' in its command line. This pattern is indicative of the Kimsuky threat group using a renamed version of the NirCmd utility to maintain persistence and execute commands silently.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task containing the string 'Google Chrome Update' in the command line, where the task is not the legitimate 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachine' task. The rule specifically targets tasks that execute PowerShell or arbitrary executables, which is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to mask malicious tasks as legitimate software updates.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that masquerade as a 'Google Chrome Update' task but are initiated by suspicious processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or schtasks.exe, and do not originate from the legitimate Google Chrome installation directories.
This rule detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility or events generated when a task is registered. This technique is commonly used for persistence and execution by adversaries.
This rule detects the creation of Windows Scheduled Tasks by monitoring for Event ID 4698 (Windows Security Log) or Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) that involves task name parameters. Adversaries frequently use the Windows Task Scheduler to establish persistence, execute malicious code, or run tasks at system startup.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll', which is associated with the persistence mechanism of Sauron Loader. The task is used to launch a DLL side-loading chain involving rnpkeys.exe and tdwp.dll.
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