Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,216 detections
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Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore' that is configured to execute a malicious JavaScript file named 'PhotoStudio.js' using wscript.exe with silent flags. This behavior is indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by the LausivLoader malware family.
Detects the creation or execution of scheduled tasks named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore' that exhibit suspicious behaviors, specifically those marked as hidden, tasks utilizing a LogonTrigger, or tasks executing wscript.exe with specific command-line arguments (e.g., //B, //Nologo) often associated with malicious script execution patterns.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Edge or OneDrive update tasks. This behavior is associated with APT36 (Transparent Tribe) and their use of modular malware to establish persistence.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names associated with Microsoft Edge updates, or the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize encoded arguments and known APT36 download cradles, indicating an attempt to establish persistence or retrieve secondary payloads.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using either 'schtasks.exe' or 'powershell.exe' (Register-ScheduledTask) where the task name or configuration references common update or startup task patterns, or contains indicators of potential process hiding or encoded command execution.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that are configured to repeat every minute, specifically targeting known malicious or suspicious filenames such as 'MicrosoftUserInterfacePicturesUpdateTackMachine', 'userscreen.exe', or 'config.cat'. The rule monitors both process creation command lines and registry modifications within the Windows Task Scheduler tree.
Detects the execution of binaries or scripts named with keywords related to AI agent plugins (e.g., 'skill', 'plugin', 'mcp-server') from potentially untrusted locations like Downloads or Temp folders. The rule further correlates this execution with post-exploitation indicators such as persistence establishment (registry keys, scheduled tasks, launch agents) or outbound network activity.
Detects creation of the 'keyroll' scheduled task used to relaunch the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain. Requires the schtasks.exe command line to both reference the 'keyroll' task name AND explicitly reference the ProgramData\keyroll path or rnpkeys.exe (ruling out unrelated tasks that happen to be named 'keyroll', e.g. legitimate key-rotation automation), and requires an INNER join corroborating an actual rnpkeys.exe relaunch from that path within 24h — a lone task-creation event with no follow-on relaunch no longer alerts.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe where the command line involves 'MicrosoftNodeRuntimeUpdater' and references 'node.exe' or '.js' files, specifically when initiated by script engines like node.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe, while excluding known legitimate nodejs installation paths.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the schtasks utility where the execution principal is set to SYSTEM. This pattern is commonly observed in malware such as DragonForce ransomware to establish persistence or execute payloads with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to run under the SYSTEM account that executes a command to add a Windows Defender exclusion using Add-MpPreference. This technique is often used to ensure persistence of security exclusions by re-applying them automatically with high privileges, even if an interactive user attempts to remove them.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that reference OneDriveUpdater or specific AccountPictures/Automata paths, which are often used by adversaries to establish persistence or run malicious code.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names associated with Microsoft Edge updates, or the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize encoded arguments and known APT36 download cradles, indicating an attempt to establish persistence or retrieve secondary payloads.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task or registry manipulation involving the string 'psychedelicloveUtils' occurring within 30 minutes of the execution of the process 'psychedeliclove.exe'. This pattern is indicative of a persistence mechanism being established by potentially malicious software.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task containing the string 'Google Chrome Update' in the command line, where the task is not the legitimate 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachine' task. The rule specifically targets tasks that execute PowerShell or arbitrary executables, which is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to mask malicious tasks as legitimate software updates.
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects instances where known NetSupport Manager binaries (client32.exe, netsupportmanager.exe, pcicfgnt.exe) are used to perform persistence-related actions, such as creating a new Windows service, adding a scheduled task, or modifying Run/Winlogon registry keys.
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