Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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AI-powered phishing-as-a-service abusing device-code authentication
Banking trojan and loader using malicious Office macro delivery
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'WindowsVaultSyncService' either through the 'schtasks.exe' command-line utility or via 'ScheduledTaskCreated' device events. This specific task name, combined with a potentially misleading description, could indicate malicious activity attempting to establish persistence or execute code.
Credential and browser data stealer distributed via OXLOADER campaigns
Loader malware delivering follow-on ransomware payloads
Detects a privilege escalation technique that exploits the Windows Error Reporting (WER) 'QueueReporting' scheduled task. An attacker leverages the Task Scheduler COM API to trigger this task, causing 'wermgr.exe' to execute as SYSTEM from an attacker-controlled directory (often via directory junction redirection), subsequently spawning shell processes.
Detects malicious scheduled task activity attributed to the Payouts King threat actor. The rule monitors for the creation, execution, and deletion of tasks using specific naming conventions ('Mozilla\UpdateTask', 'Mozilla\ElevateTask') or patterns (e.g., /ru SYSTEM, /sc ONSTART) executed by non-standard parent processes.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 4698) for task XML content and process creation events (EventCode 1) for the 'schtasks.exe' utility. The rule identifies tasks created in user-writable paths (like AppData or Temp), tasks containing suspicious keywords like 'hidden' or specific Mozilla update patterns, tasks configured to run as SYSTEM, and tasks spawned by non-standard parent processes.
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Open-source derived remote access trojan with plugin architecture
Detects the creation of a scheduled task masquerading as a legitimate Mozilla maintenance task (UpdateTask or ElevateTask). The rule specifically flags when such tasks are configured to run as SYSTEM, triggered on system start, and are created via a command line executed by a parent process of cmd.exe, which is indicative of Payouts King ransomware persistence activity.
Detects BQTLock ransomware (BaqiyatLock) establishing persistence by creating scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe. The detection monitors for scheduled task creation commands initiated by the ransomware payload (BQT.exe) or its loader (start.exe), specifically targeting tasks that execute files from high-risk paths like AppData or Temp, or directly reference BQT.exe.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks that are configured with high-privilege execution levels (SYSTEM or highest) or that reference suspicious file paths and filenames commonly associated with persistence mechanisms or VM image masquerading (e.g., QEMU files, .qcow2, vault.db). It monitors both command-line execution of schtasks.exe (Sysmon Event ID 1) and Task Scheduler configuration events (Windows Event ID 4698).
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that reference specific QEMU binaries, the 'TPMProfiler' task name, or suspicious disk image file extensions (vault.db, bisrv.dll, custom.qcow2). This activity is associated with GOLD ENCOUNTER, STAC4713, and STAC3725, who use QEMU-based virtual environments for defense evasion and persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed for persistence, typically used by Operation Poisson (e.g., Demon agent, Python keyloggers). The rule identifies tasks that execute script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, python.exe, pythonw.exe) with indicators of suspicious intent, such as hidden windows (/WindowStyle Hidden, /c) or elevated privileges (HighestAvailable, HighestPrivilege, AtLogon).
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with the 'Highest' run level, configured to execute either 'powershell.exe' or 'wscript.exe'. This pattern is consistent with persistence mechanisms observed in Operation Poisson, where attackers establish elevated, automated execution of scripts.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that point to high-risk directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) or utilize obfuscated PowerShell commands (encoded parameters). This behavior is often associated with adversary persistence or initial execution.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with specific command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to establish persistence. The rule looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task named 'Runtime Broker' that executes a program from a suspicious path within 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to maintain access to a system.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks (EventID 4698 or 4699) where the command line for the task contains references to scripting languages like PowerShell, cmd, or VBScript. It then groups these events by computer and user, flagging if two or more such tasks are created by the same user on the same computer, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility with command-line arguments indicating persistence triggers ('onlogon', 'onstart') or elevation to the 'SYSTEM' account. Adversaries commonly use these methods to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon system startup or with high privileges to facilitate further exploitation.
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