Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user or system initiates a PowerShell script (update1.ps1) via Windows Explorer in close temporal proximity (within 5 minutes) to the execution of known update-related tasks or scripts (OneDriveUpdateScheduler or update1.vbs). This correlation aims to identify potential persistence or malicious activity masquerading as update processes.
Remote Scheduled Task Creation via RPC
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks on a remote host via the Task Scheduler RPC interface (opnum 1, RegisterTask). This interface is commonly abused by lateral movement tools such as Impacket's atexec, SharpTask, and SynkLoader to execute code or establish persistence on a remote system.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by The Gentlemen ransomware, specifically the creation of malicious scheduled tasks (UpdateUser, UpdateSystem, or gentlemen_system) and modification of registry Run keys (GupdateS or GupdateU). The rule also monitors for the presence of the operator password string 'G7Vz9eyG' within command line arguments.
Detects persistence establishment for the NetSupport Manager remote access tool (client32.exe) via common Windows techniques including registry run keys, Winlogon configuration, service creation, and scheduled tasks. This activity is often associated with the abuse of legitimate RMM software as a covert remote access implant, frequently following initial access via PowerShell or script-based loaders.
Detects the execution chain of the Sauron Loader malware. The rule identifies the side-loading of 'rnp.dll' by 'rnpkeys.exe' originating from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, followed by the loading of 'tdwp.dll' which facilitates in-memory decryption and execution. Persistence is confirmed by the creation or update of a scheduled task named 'keyroll'.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the command line contains suspicious patterns such as execution of common scripting engines (PowerShell, wscript, cscript), use of common staging directories (temp, appdata, programdata), or naming conventions that mimic legitimate Windows system tasks.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks using the Windows schtasks.exe utility. The rule flags tasks that are configured to run as SYSTEM, include PowerShell encoded commands, or target directories commonly used for persistence such as Temp, AppData, or Public.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (via Event ID 4698 or schtasks.exe) involving suspicious action paths, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBins, or tasks configured to run as SYSTEM by non-administrator users, which is a common persistence mechanism for malware.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using Event ID 4698 or command-line execution of schtasks.exe. The rule specifically looks for tasks created in suspicious paths such as AppData or ProgramData, or tasks configured to run with highest privileges and/or marked as hidden, which are common indicators of persistence mechanisms used by adversaries.
Detects the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments ('--action install --force --key') in conjunction with the presence of the 'level.exe' binary in its designated Program Files directory. The rule optionally identifies related scheduled task creation for 'Level Watchdog' and network activity associated with the 'level.io' domain or specific IP address.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the task execution path points to common script interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32) or is located in common user-writable directories (Users, Temp, AppData). Additionally, it flags tasks configured to execute under the 'SYSTEM' account, which is a common technique used to achieve persistence with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as using common temporary directories, executing PowerShell with encoded commands, running tasks as SYSTEM, or using tasks that attempt to hide by using unusual naming conventions. These techniques are often used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution in a stealthy manner.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that reference specific task names associated with potentially suspicious activity or persistence (e.g., PlutonAgentScheduler, EnterpriseMgmtServicesScheduler). The rule specifically looks for tasks being placed or modified within 'microsoft' or 'pluton' directories or paths, which may indicate an attempt to masquerade as legitimate system services.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that either trigger on user logon or startup and point to common writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData), or tasks created with a remote system argument, which is frequently used by adversaries for persistence or lateral movement.
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