Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects cmd.exe execution where an HTTP/HTTPS URL points directly to a dot-quad IPv4 address or a hex-encoded IPv4 address, excluding RFC1918 private ranges. Threat actors commonly use raw or hex IP literals to avoid domain filtering and deliver staged payloads.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming" NPM supply chain attack. This includes the silent installation of the 'bun' runtime during an 'npm install' and a destructive file shredding command. The rule filters out legitimate manual installations by developers by checking the initiating parent process.
Detects suspicious behavior where a Node.js-based application, potentially EvilAi malware, launches cmd.exe to query MachineGuid from the registry or system model via PowerShell. This activity indicates potential fingerprinting or persistence activity, often originating from the \AppData\Local\Programs\ directory with medium integrity.
Detects the execution of a malicious JAR file, a technique used by the Bloody Wolf APT group to download and execute NetSupport RAT components.
Detects Go runtime executing scripts from temporary directories, indicative of FlexibleFerret backdoor.
Detects creation of .host file in temp directories by FlexibleFerret malware for identifying machines on macOS systems.
Detects a potential BADAUDIO DLL Sideloading persistence attempt, a technique used by APT24. The rule looks for the creation of a DLL, an executable, and a script/shortcut file (VBS, BAT, LNK) in a common user directory within a short time frame.
Detects when Visual Studio Code or its extension host spawns PowerShell, CMD, or similar interpreters (possible SleepyDuck payload execution).
This query focuses on detecting the Brazilian banking trojan known as Maverick. This malware has recently gained attention due to its aggressive propagation methods, particularly through WhatsApp Web. By leveraging social engineering techniques, Maverick spreads malicious links and attachments disguised as legitimate messages, tricking users into executing harmful code. Once installed, the trojan is capable of intercepting banking credentials, manipulating transactions, and exfiltrating sensitive financial information. Detecting Maverick requires monitoring suspicious script executions, abnormal network traffic patterns, and unauthorized use of processes such as cscript.exe and wscript.exe, which are often abused by attackers to run malicious payloads. The query aims to identify indicators of compromise associated with Maverick’s activity, helping security teams mitigate its impact and protect users from financial fraud
This rule detects the execution of unsigned or invalidly signed executable files from user-writable folders such as \Users\ or \ProgramData\. It specifically looks for process creation events where the initiating process's signature status is not 'Valid' and the SHA256 hash of the executable is not in a predefined whitelist. Additionally, it filters for executables with a global prevalence of less than 2500 and an unsigned signature state. This aims to identify potentially malicious or unauthorized software being run from locations where users typically have write permissions, bypassing standard software deployment and security controls.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) spawns 'node.exe' with command-line arguments containing '-e' and the process path is located within the 'AppData\Roaming' or 'AppData\Local' directories. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as the execution of Node.js-based scripts or malware by PowerShell, potentially for persistence or further execution within user-specific application data folders.
This query identifies single character file names used at point of execution or in command line arguments with optional logic to look for the file creations.
This query retrieves the most recent record for each device and filters the results to show devices that are currently isolated.
• The DeviceInfo table contains details about each device and its status over time.
• The summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName part selects the latest entry (based on Timestamp) for every device.
• The where MitigationStatus contains "Isolated" filter ensures that only devices with an isolation-related mitigation status are displayed.
• The DeviceInfo table contains details about each device and its status over time.
• The summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName part selects the latest entry (based on Timestamp) for every device.
• The where MitigationStatus contains "Isolated" filter ensures that only devices with an isolation-related mitigation status are displayed.
A composite detection rule that identifies multiple techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) associated with the RansomHub intrusion detailed in "The DFIR Report". This rule focuses on process creation events and flags the execution of specific credential dumping tools, network scanners, defense evasion commands, ransomware behaviors, and exfiltration tool chains. An alert from this rule indicates a high probability of malicious activity consistent with this threat actor's methodology.
This query detects execution of processes related to Visual Studio Code extension signing or caching that involve known Glassworm-compromised extensions. Based on indicators published by KOI (October 20, 2025), it identifies suspicious .vsix package operations potentially associated with self-propagating malicious VSCode extensions observed in OpenVSX and Microsoft VSCode marketplaces.
To extract vscode extension version I used this the https://detections.ai/rules/924f7b5f-d8df-4eed-ba06-08c657f65891.
To extract vscode extension version I used this the https://detections.ai/rules/924f7b5f-d8df-4eed-ba06-08c657f65891.
A detection triggered on endpoint events where common system binaries (e.g., mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) were launched by user-facing parent processes (explorer.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe) and executed suspicious command-lines. The pattern matches the evolving technique used in ClickFix-style campaigns whereby malicious pages dynamically place payloads into the clipboard and prompt users to paste or execute them.
Detects suspicious behavior where a Node.js-based application launches cmd.exe to query MachineGuid from the registry, indicating potential fingerprinting or persistence activity by EvilAi malware. The rule specifically looks for processes initiated from a suspicious folder path, where node.exe is the parent process, and cmd.exe is used to query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography' for 'MachineGuid'.
Detects the LANDFALL Android spyware components, specifically the 'b.so' loader and the 'l.so' SELinux policy manipulator.
This rule detects the execution of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) by either the w3wp.exe process (IIS worker process) or the wsusservice.exe process (Windows Server Update Services). This behavior can indicate a compromise, potentially leveraging vulnerabilities in web applications or WSUS to achieve remote code execution.
Detect the patten execution of the the brazilian malware Zapgrande
Detects when the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) process (wsusservice.exe) or its associated IIS worker process (w3wp.exe with 'wsuspool' in its command line) spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This activity is highly suspicious as WSUS services typically do not need to execute command-line interpreters, and could indicate an attempt to exploit a vulnerability or execute arbitrary commands on the system.
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