Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It identifies attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that use PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather critical user information, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter to query local user accounts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to enumerate user accounts for situational awareness or Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` using the `Invoke-WmiMethod` cmdlet to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
The analytic detects potentially malicious command lines using a pretrained machine learning text classifier. It identifies unusual keyword combinations in command lines, such as "streamreader," "webclient," "mutex," "function," and "computehash," which are often associated with adversarial PowerShell code execution for C2 communication. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command lines longer than 200 characters. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
This analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.
This analytic identifies the use of the `get-localgroup` command executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gather information about local group memberships, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to identify and target privileged accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.
This rule detects the execution of known Proof-of-Concept (PoC) executables for the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472). It specifically looks for `cmd.exe` spawning executables named `cool.exe` or `zero.exe` with command-line arguments indicating administrative context and execution flags. Additionally, it identifies subsequent actions such as `taskkill` commands or `powershell` execution, which are common post-exploitation activities after successful ZeroLogon exploitation.
Detects the execution of known attacker tools, specifically those associated with the IronSharpPack toolset. This rule identifies process launches where common command and scripting interpreters (cmd.exe, python, ipy.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, wsl.exe) are used to execute scripts or binaries with names indicative of IronSharpPack components. The presence of these tools in an unauthorized environment suggests malicious activity, often related to offensive security operations, post-exploitation, or privilege escalation.
Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic". This technique is used by threat actors and ransomware strains to evade defenses by removing forensic evidence.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the CrushFTP service that may indicate exploitation of remote code execution vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31161, where attackers can achieve RCE through crafted HTTP requests. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows executables (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe etc.) that attackers typically use post-exploitation to execute malicious commands.
Detects the creation of files with scripting or executable extensions by the MySQL daemon process. This activity could indicate the abuse of MySQL User Defined Functions (UDFs) to download and execute malware, often as part of a broader compromise or to establish persistence.
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell one-liners designed to download and execute PowerShell modules in memory. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell command lines containing a URL (e.g., 'http://127.0.0.1'), the 'IRM' (Invoke-RestMethod) alias within a loop ('%{(IRM $_)}'), and the 'Invoke' keyword, which are indicative of in-memory module execution.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell in conjunction with nslookup to create a download cradle. This technique leverages nslookup to extract payloads from DNS TXT records, which are then processed by PowerShell. This is a known method for adversaries to download malicious content while potentially evading traditional network defenses by using DNS for data transfer.
Detects the deletion of files commonly used for backups by adversaries to prevent system recovery. This rule specifically looks for deletion actions performed by common Windows command-line interpreters and system utilities on files with backup-related extensions.
This rule detects successful user logins to the "Azure Active Directory PowerShell" application within Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). While legitimate administrative tasks may involve this application, the rule's description highlights that programmatic access to Azure AD should generally occur through other applications. Therefore, direct logins to this specific PowerShell application could indicate suspicious activity, such as an attacker using compromised credentials to gain access to user information or perform administrative actions. The rule focuses on successful login events and groups them by user over a 5-minute window, which can help identify clustered or repeated login attempts by a single user.
Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion
Detects a powershell download cradle using nslookup. This cradle uses nslookup to extract payloads from DNS records.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
Detects a network connection that was initiated from a PowerShell process. Malicious PowerShell scripts often download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs. This rule can be used as a basis for hunting for anomalies.
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