Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the Evil-WinRM hack tool by identifying specific hardcoded strings within PowerShell Module logs. This rule looks for patterns associated with Evil-WinRM's functionality, such as specific PowerShell commands for file operations, binary invocation, and registry queries, executed within the context of wsmprovhost.exe.
Detects PowerShell execution that utilizes the bitwise XOR (bxor) operator. Attackers may use this as an alternative obfuscation method to Base64 encoded commands to evade detection. Investigation of the command line and process tree is recommended to determine if the activity is malicious.
This rule detects the execution of a PowerShell script that utilizes the "Send-MailMessage" cmdlet along with the "-Attachments" flag. This combination is a strong indicator of potential data exfiltration via email, where an adversary might be sending sensitive files as attachments through SMTP. The rule aims to identify attempts to steal data by exfiltrating it over an unencrypted network protocol, specifically SMTP, to an alternative network location.
Detects the execution of commands via the Windows Run dialog box by monitoring modifications to the "RunMRU" registry key. This technique has been observed in campaigns where threat actors trick users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often under the guise of CAPTCHA verification steps, to deliver malware like Lumma Stealer.
Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key.
This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps.
This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps.
Detects a PowerShell script used by Lace Tempest APT to erase evidence from victim servers by exploiting CVE-2023-47246 as reported by SysAid Team. The script specifically targets files related to 'usersfiles.war' and 'SysAidServer' within a Tomcat directory, indicating an attempt to clean up traces of an intrusion or exploit.
Detects a PowerShell script used by the Lace Tempest APT group to launch their malware loader by exploiting CVE-2023-47246. The script contains specific strings related to the SysAid server path, the execution of 'user.exe', and the removal of temporary files.
This rule detects a specific command-line execution pattern used by the threat actor 'Lace Tempest' to download 'Cobalt Strike'. The pattern involves PowerShell's 'IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(' command, which is commonly used for in-memory execution of downloaded scripts or payloads. The detection specifically looks for the combination of '-nop -w hidden -c IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(' and '/a') in the command line, indicating an attempt to download and execute a script, likely a Cobalt Strike payload, as reported by the SysAid Team.
Detects the usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet or its alias "ipmo" in PowerShell command lines to add new Cmdlets to the current PowerShell session. This rule aims to identify instances where modules are dynamically loaded, which can be a legitimate administrative action but also a technique used by adversaries for execution or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the creation of a remote thread by a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) into specific target processes, namely rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This activity is often indicative of defense evasion and execution techniques used by adversaries to inject malicious code or achieve persistence by leveraging legitimate system binaries.
Detects PowerShell commands that decrypt an ".LNK" file to drop the next stage of the malware. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell execution combined with command-line arguments indicative of file system enumeration (Get-ChildItem, dir, gci, ls), file content retrieval (Get-Content, gc, cat, type, ReadAllBytes), and specific patterns involving ".lnk" files, recursion, skipping bytes, expanding properties, and writing all bytes, suggesting decryption and dropping of subsequent malware stages.
Detects specific process creation patterns associated with UNC2452 (SolarWinds Compromise) activity, as identified by Microsoft Defender ATP queries. This includes the use of 7-Zip for archiving, wscript.exe executing VBS scripts, and rundll32.exe for DLL execution, often involving specific command-line arguments and parent-child relationships.
Detects the execution of a shell (PowerShell, Bash, WSL) via a Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel and execute arbitrary commands on the system.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that attempt to discover security software installed on a system. Specifically, it looks for the use of 'Get-Process' (or its alias 'gps') piped to 'Where-Object' (or its alias '?') to filter processes based on keywords commonly associated with security products such as 'avira', 'carbonblack', 'cylance', 'defender', 'kaspersky', 'malware', 'sentinel', 'symantec', and 'virus'. The filtering can be applied to process properties like Company, Description, Name, Path, or Product. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to enumerate defensive tools present on the system.
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
This rule detects the execution of BloodHound and SharpHound, which are reconnaissance tools used to map Active Directory environments. It identifies these tools by their product name, description, company name, executable image names, and specific command-line arguments often used for data collection, such as 'CollectionMethod All', '--Loop', '--PortScanTimeout', '-JsonFolder', '-ZipFileName', 'DCOnly', and '--NoSaveCache', as well as PowerShell cmdlets like 'Invoke-Bloodhound' and 'Get-BloodHoundData'.
Detects potential MuddyWater APT activity involving the use of mshta for execution, PowerShell for system information discovery (operating system, network configuration, security center), and a PowerShell-based backdoor with base64 encoding and web requests.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the Veeam SQL Server database process. This activity could indicate a successful Remote Code Execution (RCE) or SQL Injection attack against the Veeam database, where an attacker has managed to execute system commands or scripts.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters indicative of obfuscated or malicious PowerShell execution. This includes attempts to execute base64 encoded commands, use of `IEX` (Invoke-Expression) with hidden windows and `New-Object`, execution of encoded commands, and use of `WebClient` to download and execute content.
This rule detects the use of potentially suspicious keywords within PowerShell scripts that are often associated with exploitation frameworks or advanced attack techniques. Specifically, it looks for reflection-related keywords like 'System.Reflection.Assembly.Load', '[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load', '[Reflection.Assembly]::Load', 'System.Reflection.AssemblyName', 'Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess', 'Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder', and keywords related to interop services and process manipulation such as 'Runtime.InteropServices.UnmanagedType', 'Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute', 'SuspendThread', and 'rundll32'. These keywords can indicate attempts to load assemblies in-memory, interact with unmanaged code, or manipulate processes, which are common tactics used by malware and red teaming tools.
This rule detects suspicious command-line parameters commonly used by the Empire post-exploitation framework when launching PowerShell. Specifically, it looks for combinations of parameters such as '-NoP', '-sta', '-NonI', '-W Hidden', '-Enc', '-noP', '-w 1', '-enc', '-enc SQB', '-nop', '-exec bypass', and '-EncodedCommand'. These parameters are often used to execute encoded PowerShell scripts in a hidden or non-interactive manner, which is a common tactic for malicious PowerShell execution.
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