Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to decode a base64 encoded Gzip archive within a PowerShell script. This technique is often used by adversaries to load malicious content into memory, leveraging standard encoding for obfuscation and memory-resident execution.
Detects updates to scheduled tasks (EventID 4702) where the new task content (`TaskContentNew`) contains suspicious keywords. These keywords include common temporary or user-writable directories often used by malware for staging or execution, combined with suspicious commands or scripting interpreters. This rule aims to identify adversaries establishing persistence or executing malicious code via scheduled tasks.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to load .NET assemblies reflectively using Base64 encoded strings. This technique is often used by adversaries to execute malicious code in memory, evading disk-based detections.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands embedded within a link (.lnk) file. This rule specifically looks for instances where 'explorer.exe' launches 'cmd.exe', and the command line of 'cmd.exe' contains both 'powershell' and '.lnk', indicating an attempt to execute PowerShell via a shortcut file.
This rule detects a PowerShell downgrade attack where an adversary attempts to force PowerShell to use an older, less secure engine version (2.0) while the host system is configured for a newer version. This technique is often used to bypass security features like Script Block Logging which are present in newer PowerShell versions.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by common Windows shell and scripting processes such as mshta.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe, wmiprvse.exe, and regsvr32.exe. The suspicious child processes include schtasks.exe, nslookup.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and mshta.exe, which are often abused for various malicious activities like persistence, data exfiltration, or further execution.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script known as POWERHOLD, which has been attributed to the FIN7 threat group. The rule specifically looks for the presence of '$env:APPDATA', 'function MainPayload', '::WriteAllBytes', and 'wscript.exe' within the PowerShell script block text, indicating the execution of this specific malicious script.
This rule detects the presence of keywords commonly associated with well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks such as Mimikatz and Metasploit within PowerShell script blocks. The keywords indicate attempts to perform privileged operations like manipulating access tokens, reading process memory, or other actions typically involved in credential dumping and privilege escalation. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the script content.
This rule detects PowerShell execution where the command line contains Base64 encoded strings that decode to 'Invoke-' keywords. It specifically looks for both UTF-8 and UTF-16 Little Endian (LE) encodings of 'Invoke-' when PowerShell or pwsh.exe is executed with the '-e' (encoded command) flag. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell commands.
Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 threat group (also known as APT29 or Nobelium) for execution. The rule looks for PowerShell commands that use 'Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist' or 'wmic /node: process call create' in conjunction with 'rundll32 c:\windows'. This pattern was observed in the SolarWinds Compromise.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the Hermetic Wiper malware, specifically looking for a process named 'postgresql.exe' in a policydefinitions directory or specific command-line arguments used for credential dumping and logging.
This rule detects the potential execution of the POWERTRASH PowerShell script by looking for a specific combination of strings within the PowerShell script block text. These strings include .NET framework components related to compression (IO.Compression.DeflateStream), memory manipulation (IO.MemoryStream), base64 decoding (::FromBase64String), and reflection/code execution (GetDelegateForFunctionPointer, .Invoke(), GlobalAssemblyCache). The presence of these indicators together suggests a highly obfuscated or advanced PowerShell script, often used for malicious purposes like in-memory execution or bypassing detection.
Detects inbound network connections to ports 5985 or 5986, which are commonly used for PowerShell Remoting (WinRM). This rule specifically looks for EventID 5156 (Windows Filtering Platform Connection) with a LayerRTID of 44, indicating an inbound connection.
Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combination with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh executable names combined with common encoded command flags (-e, -enc, etc.) and specific Base64 encoded strings frequently seen in malicious payloads.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell and WMI. Adversaries often delete shadow copies to prevent system recovery and hinder forensic analysis, especially in ransomware attacks. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell commands that interact with 'Win32_ShadowCopy' via 'Get-WmiObject' and then perform a 'Delete()' operation or use 'Remove-WmiObject'.
Detects the creation of suspicious child processes by 'scrcons.exe' (Script Event Consumer). 'scrcons.exe' is a legitimate Windows component used for WMI event handling, but its spawning of common scripting interpreters, proxy execution binaries, or task schedulers can indicate malicious activity, often related to persistence or execution techniques leveraging WMI.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe, which is often abused by adversaries for execution and defense evasion. The rule specifically looks for common Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) and scripting interpreters being launched by WmiPrvSE, including certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, wscript, and cmd.exe with specific command-line arguments related to scripting or LOLBINs.
This rule detects specific code artifacts commonly found in offensive PowerShell payloads such as Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, and PowerSploit. These artifacts often remain unchanged due to poor operational security practices by attackers. The rule looks for specific strings like '$DoIt', 'harmj0y', 'mattifestation', '_RastaMouse', 'tifkin_', and '0xdeadbeef' within PowerShell script payloads.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell invocations by looking for specific command parameters that indicate obfuscation, hidden execution, or non-interactive sessions. Specifically, it flags the use of encoded commands (`-enc`, `-EncodedCommand`, `-ec`), hidden window styles (`-w hidden`, `-window hidden`, `-windowstyle hidden`, `-w 1`), and non-interactive flags (`-noni`, `-noninteractive`). These parameters are commonly used by adversaries to conceal their activities and bypass detection.
This rule detects the creation of potentially suspicious child processes by WinRAR.exe. Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities in WinRAR, such as CVE-2023-38831, to achieve arbitrary code execution. This rule specifically looks for WinRAR.exe spawning common scripting or execution binaries like cmd.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, and wscript.exe. Such activity is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to execute further commands or payloads after exploiting WinRAR.
Detects suspicious processes, including various shells and utilities, spawned by the WinRM host process (wsmprovhost.exe). This activity can indicate an adversary using WinRM for remote execution, potentially for initial access, persistence, or privilege escalation.
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