Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects process executions that exhibit characteristics commonly associated with Emotet malware, specifically focusing on obfuscated PowerShell command line arguments. The rule looks for specific base64 encoded strings and patterns often used by Emotet for defense evasion and execution.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header contains ' WindowsPowerShell/'. This pattern is indicative of PowerShell making web requests, potentially for downloading files, interacting with web services, or command and control activities. This can be a legitimate administrative activity but is also frequently abused by adversaries.
Detects when the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) spawns a Windows shell or command-line executable. This behavior can indicate an adversary abusing the MMC2.0 Application COM object for remote code execution or lateral movement. The rule specifically looks for mmc.exe as the parent process of common shell executables like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, reg.exe, regsvr32.exe, or other scripting/command interpreters.
This rule detects suspicious scripting commands within WMI event consumers, which can be indicative of persistence mechanisms. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell web download commands (`new-object net.webclient .downloadstring`, `new-object net.webclient .downloadfile`), common PowerShell execution flags (`-nop`, `-noprofile`, `-decode`, `-enc`), and references to `WScript.Shell` or `System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform` within the 'Destination' field of WMI event logs. These patterns are frequently used by attackers to execute malicious scripts or download payloads via WMI persistence.
Detects the creation of suspicious printer ports that point to executable files or use the 'Generic / Text Only' driver, which can be abused for persistence or execution, often associated with CVE-2020-1048 (PrintDemon).
This rule detects specific file paths, command-line arguments, and PowerShell commands associated with the Greenbug espionage group's May 2020 campaign, as reported by Symantec. It looks for suspicious executables in ProgramData directories, the use of 'revshell.exe' and 'ncat.exe' (especially with '-e cmd.exe'), and various PowerShell command patterns indicative of malicious activity, including base64 encoded strings.
This rule detects potential exploitation of CVE-2023-21554, dubbed 'QueueJumper'. The vulnerability allows for unauthorized remote code execution within the MSMQ service. The rule specifically looks for the 'mqsvc.exe' process (Microsoft Message Queuing service) spawning common Windows command-line interpreters or scripting engines, which would indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code.
This rule detects the creation of specific files that indicate interactive PowerShell usage within the SYSTEM user context. The rule looks for the creation of 'ConsoleHost_history.txt' or 'StartupProfileData-Interactive' files in the 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\' or 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\' directories respectively. The presence of these files in the SYSTEM profile suggests that PowerShell was used interactively by the SYSTEM account, which is highly unusual and could indicate privilege escalation or malicious activity.
Detects modifications to Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions. This activity is often performed by adversaries to disable or bypass security controls, allowing their malicious activities to go undetected.
Detects attempts to downgrade PowerShell to version 2.0 by checking for specific command-line arguments. This technique is often used by adversaries to bypass security features like Script Block Logging and AMSI, which are present in newer versions of PowerShell.
Detects the usage of the ".Net.Sockets.TCPClient" class within PowerShell, which is commonly abused to establish remote connections and reverse shells. This technique is notably used by tools like Nishang's "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" and other malicious scripts to create outbound network connections for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add Exchange snap-ins and potentially export mailbox data. This activity has been observed in attacks by threat groups such as HAFNIUM and APT27, often as part of post-exploitation to collect sensitive information from Exchange servers.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocations using partial parameter names for common obfuscation techniques. This rule specifically looks for truncated forms of parameters like '-windowstyle hidden', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-EncodedCommand', and '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', which are frequently used by adversaries to hide their activity or bypass security measures.
Detects potential PowerShell execution from a DLL instead of the usual PowerShell process, as seen used in PowerShdll. This detection assumes that PowerShell commands are passed via the CommandLine.
Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2020-10189) by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the Java executable associated with Desktop Central. This exploitation often leads to the execution of command-line utilities for further compromise.
This rule detects the creation of PowerShell script files with specific filenames or suffixes that have been observed in campaigns attributed to the FIN7 threat group. Specifically, it looks for files ending with '_64refl.ps1' or named 'host_ip.ps1'. These patterns are indicative of PowerShell scripts used by FIN7 for various malicious activities, including execution and potentially reflective loading.
Detects a PowerShell process attempting to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory. This activity is a strong indicator of potential credential dumping attempts, where an attacker tries to extract sensitive authentication material (like passwords or hashes) from memory.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that directly call a wide range of Windows API (WinAPI) functions. Adversaries often leverage direct WinAPI calls from PowerShell to bypass typical detection mechanisms that focus on standard PowerShell cmdlets or .NET methods. The rule specifically looks for a comprehensive list of sensitive WinAPI functions within the script block text, which can indicate various malicious activities such as process injection, privilege escalation, credential access, and memory manipulation. This rule is primarily intended for threat hunting to identify unusual and potentially malicious PowerShell script behavior.
Detects the presence of Silence EmpireDNSAgent by looking for specific PowerShell script block text patterns associated with both the Empire post-exploitation framework and Dnscat2 tunneling. The rule combines keywords related to system shutdown/reboot, process manipulation, and DNS tunneling techniques used by this malware.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts attempting to use specific Windows API functions that are commonly associated with malicious activities such as process injection (VirtualAlloc, OpenProcess, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), token manipulation (OpenProcessToken, LookupPrivilegeValue, AdjustTokenPrivileges, DuplicateTokenEx), and memory operations (ReadProcessMemory, VirtualFree). Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the script content.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is invoked, and there's a mismatch between the PowerShell engine version and the host version. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell classic start events where the 'Data' field contains an 'EngineVersion' of 2, 4, or 5, while simultaneously containing a 'HostVersion' of 3. This version mismatch can indicate attempts to evade detection or exploit vulnerabilities by using an older or specific PowerShell engine version within a newer host environment.
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