Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell execution using the `Set-Acl` cmdlet to modify the Access Control List (ACL) of a file or folder. This can be used by adversaries to change permissions, potentially granting themselves or other users/groups unauthorized access or denying access to legitimate users/services as a form of defense evasion or impact.
Detects PowerShell scripts that utilize compression and decompression techniques, specifically looking for 'new-object', 'text.encoding]::ascii', 'system.io.compression.deflatestream', 'system.io.streamreader', and 'readtoend' in the payload. This pattern is indicative of obfuscated PowerShell often used by tools like Invoke-Obfuscation to hide malicious code.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize 'clip.exe' to interact with the clipboard, often as part of an obfuscation technique like those used by Invoke-Obfuscation. The rule specifically looks for patterns where 'echo' is piped to 'clip' and then followed by terms related to 'Clipboard' or 'invoke' with potential character obfuscation.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution leveraging MSHTA. This technique is often used for defense evasion by adversaries to execute malicious scripts without directly invoking PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for a combination of keywords indicative of this method, including 'set', '&&', 'mshta', 'vbscript:createobject', '.run', and '(window.close)' within the PowerShell module payload.
Detects suspicious PowerShell commands that utilize 'System.Net.WebClient' to download files or strings from the internet. This technique is commonly used by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or to fetch additional malicious payloads.
Detects code fragments commonly found in small and obfuscated PowerShell scripts designed to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). The rule specifically looks for the combination of '[Ref].Assembly.GetType', 'SetValue($null,$true)', and 'NonPublic,Static' within PowerShell script block text, which are indicative of reflection-based AMSI bypass techniques.
This rule detects the usage of the 'Add-WindowsCapability' PowerShell cmdlet, specifically looking for attempts to add Windows capabilities. It explicitly targets the addition of 'OpenSSH' related capabilities (both 'OpenSSH.Server' and 'OpenSSH.Client'). This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to install tools for remote access or other malicious purposes.
Detects PowerShell scripts that enumerate installed hotfixes by querying 'Win32_QuickFixEngineering' and looking for 'HotFixID'. This activity is often performed by attackers during the discovery phase to gather system information.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize 'clip.exe' to interact with the clipboard, potentially for defense evasion or data manipulation. The rule specifically looks for the pattern 'echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?)' within PowerShell script block text, indicating an attempt to pipe output to clip.exe and then interact with the clipboard or invoke further commands.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to instantiate the MsXml2.XmlHttp COM object. Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution, and the MsXml2.XmlHttp COM object can be used for network communication, such as downloading additional payloads or exfiltrating data. This technique is often used by malware or attackers to perform actions like C2 communication or data transfer.
Detects attempts to write data into NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) using PowerShell cmdlets like `Set-Content` or `Add-Content` in conjunction with the `-Stream` parameter. This technique can be used by adversaries to hide malicious data or executables on a system.
This rule detects the use of 'PromptForCredential' within PowerShell script block logs. This function is used to display a dialog box that prompts the user for credentials, which can be abused by adversaries to harvest user credentials. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled.
Detects the use of the PSAttack PowerShell hack tool by looking for the specific string 'PS ATTACK!!!' within PowerShell script block logs. This tool is often used for post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to discover sensitive files by looking for common file extensions associated with credentials or password managers (e.g., .pass, .kdbx, .kdb). It specifically targets commands like 'ls', 'get-childitem', or 'gci' combined with the '-recurse' parameter, indicating a recursive search for these sensitive file types.
Detects PowerShell scripts that create TCP listeners and accept client connections, which is indicative of tunneling activity. The rule specifically looks for the use of '[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]', 'System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener', and 'AcceptTcpClient' within the script block text.
Detects Windows command lines that miss a space before or after the /c or /k flag when running a command using cmd.exe. This could indicate an attempt at command obfuscation or a typo. The rule specifically looks for patterns like 'cmd.exe/c', '\cmd/c', '"cmd/c', and similar for /k and /r, as well as specific commands like '/cwhoami', '/cpowershell', etc., where the space is missing. It filters out common false positives related to VS Code and specific command line endings.
This rule detects various obfuscated PowerShell IEX (Invoke-Expression) invocation patterns generated by the Invoke-Obfuscation framework. It specifically looks for command-line arguments that use variable manipulation (e.g., $PSHome, $ShellId, $env:Public, $env:ComSpec) and string concatenation to construct and execute PowerShell commands, which is a common technique for defense evasion.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution leveraging MSHTA. The rule specifically looks for command-line arguments that indicate the use of 'set', '&&', 'mshta', 'vbscript:createobject', '.run', and '(window.close)', which are common patterns in MSHTA-based PowerShell obfuscation.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands that leverage `clip.exe` to retrieve content from the clipboard for execution. This technique is often used to evade detection by hiding malicious scripts in the clipboard until runtime.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell download cradle that leverages nslookup to extract payloads from DNS TXT records. This technique is often used for defense evasion by adversaries to retrieve malicious code or data over DNS.
Detects attempts to capture audio using PowerShell cmdlets, specifically looking for commands related to the 'WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet' module or similar audio device manipulation cmdlets. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to record sensitive conversations or gather information from the compromised system's environment.
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