Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of multiple offensive toolkits and commands through the process execution datamodel. This method captures commands given directly to powershell.exe, allowing for the identification of suspicious activities including several well-known tools used for credential theft, lateral movement, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the environment.
This rule detects PowerShell processes initiated with command-line arguments that indicate obfuscation (e.g., -enc, -encodedCommand) or attempts to download or execute external content (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is commonly observed during the initial execution of malicious payloads or tool delivery.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a known web server process (e.g., IIS, Nginx, Apache) spawns a command shell process, followed shortly by the creation of a file with a web shell-like extension (.aspx, .jsp, .php) in the same environment. This pattern is indicative of an adversary exploiting a public-facing application to upload and potentially access a web shell.
Detects the invocation of powershell.exe or pwsh.exe using encoded command flags (-EncodedCommand/-enc) in combination with stealth-oriented arguments such as -WindowStyle Hidden or -NoProfile. This pattern is frequently utilized by threat actors to execute obfuscated, malicious scripts while bypassing command-line visibility and standard profile configurations.
Detects instances where common scripting engines like Python or Node.js are used to spawn command shells (CMD, PowerShell, or Bash) followed by the execution of suspicious commands commonly associated with reconnaissance, file exfiltration, or lateral movement.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command execution patterns commonly associated with malicious activities, including base64-encoded commands, download cradles used to fetch external content, and various obfuscation techniques like character concatenation or backtick escaping to hide malicious intent.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell activity by identifying common obfuscation patterns, including encoded commands (Base64), IEX (Invoke-Expression) download cradles, and execution with hidden windows. It triggers when multiple suspicious flags are present or when an unusually long encoded blob is identified in script blocks, command lines, or process arguments.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service using common administrative tools like sc.exe or PowerShell's New-Service cmdlet that masquerades as the legitimate Windows Time service (w32time). The rule specifically flags service creation commands that use relevant service names but point to non-standard, suspicious executable paths or configurations, potentially indicating persistence or malicious activity by RemotePanel.
Detects a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis first-stage loader, which involves the loading of specific suspicious DLLs (masquerading as common software components) followed by the extraction or creation of an 'encryptbase64.ps1' second-stage loader within a short timeframe (10 minutes) on the same host.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by using reflection to modify internal AMSI-related structures and memory flags (e.g., AmsiUtils, amsiInitFailed). This technique involves manipulating system objects to neutralize AMSI's ability to inspect malicious script content.
This rule detects potential ClickFix/InstallFix attacks where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command from a website that mimics a legitimate developer tool installation (e.g., Claude Code, NotebookLM). The detection flags the use of common download-and-execute cmdlets (e.g., irm, iwr, iex) within common Windows shell interpreters while excluding known legitimate vendor install domains.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects potentially malicious PowerShell command-line activity by identifying patterns indicative of obfuscation, fileless execution, AMSI bypass, and downloading/executing remote payloads. The rule flags instances where long command lines are used with encoded flags, base64 decoding logic is paired with execution primitives, explicit AMSI bypass attempts, or combinations of encoded commands with web requests or hidden windows.
Detects attempts to disable, modify, or stop security software and endpoint protection services. The rule monitors for registry changes to Windows Defender settings, manual service management commands (sc, net) targeting security processes, and PowerShell execution using 'Set-MpPreference' to disable protection features.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device involving a remote MSI installation followed by PowerShell-based process elevation and administrative checks using fltmc.exe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to deploy malicious packages remotely and escalate privileges within the environment.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download content from a remote URI and execute it using encoded commands or expression evaluation, a pattern commonly used by the FIN8 threat group (Syssphinx) to deploy the BADHATCH backdoor.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Winword/Excel) spawning PowerShell or MSHTA with base64-encoded command-line arguments, followed by subsequent persistence mechanisms such as creating scheduled tasks or modifying Registry Run keys. This behavior is indicative of APT38 (BlueNoroff) and similar campaigns delivering banking Trojans via malicious Office macros.
This rule detects instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) or Microsoft Excel (excel.exe) initiate a PowerShell (powershell.exe) process containing command-line arguments typical of downloader stagers, such as 'IEX', 'DownloadString', or hidden execution flags. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based delivery of malware, frequently observed in campaigns associated with FIN7/Carbanak and other threat actors utilizing Cobalt Strike or similar offensive frameworks.
Detects the Antino backdoor components (GatherOsState.exe or a standalone installer) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe to execute commands, indicative of command-and-control tasking.
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