Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a known web server process (e.g., IIS, Nginx, Apache) spawns a command shell process, followed shortly by the creation of a file with a web shell-like extension (.aspx, .jsp, .php) in the same environment. This pattern is indicative of an adversary exploiting a public-facing application to upload and potentially access a web shell.
Detects potential 'ClickFix' activity where a browser or file explorer process initiates a shell (e.g., cmd, powershell, osascript) with command arguments indicative of remote script execution, obfuscated commands, or web-based payload downloading. This pattern matches known social engineering tactics that entice users to copy-paste malicious code into a system shell.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where the binaries 'COTFileReadApp.exe' or 'DeElevate64.exe' initiate child processes or are themselves parent processes to suspicious binaries such as 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', or script hosts ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe'). This pattern is indicative of a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) or sideloading chain dropping and executing follow-on payloads.
Detects the FileFix (ClickFix) social engineering technique, where an attacker tricks a user into pasting malicious command lines into the Windows File Explorer address bar. The rule correlates a process execution (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) originating from explorer.exe with recent registry writes to shell history artifacts (RunMRU, TypedPaths, or ShellBags) within a 120-second window, identifying the characteristic 'paste-and-execute' behavior.
Detects the use of Python or Pip utilities as parent processes to spawn potentially malicious binaries such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl.exe, or rundll32.exe. This activity is often associated with the execution of downloaded payloads or shell commands directly through package manager workflows.
This rule detects suspicious process lineage where Python (python.exe or pip.exe) is initiating the execution of Windows command shell (cmd.exe) or Windows calculator (calc.exe). This pattern is often associated with exploitation of malicious Python site-hook files or similar techniques where a Python environment is leveraged to spawn secondary processes, potentially leading to unauthorized command execution.
Detects suspicious command-line fragments being written to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which is used by the Explorer 'Run' dialog to store history. Adversaries may abuse this by injecting malicious command lines that are then executed when a user attempts to run a program.
FileFix (mr.d0x, June 2025) tricks victims into pasting a clipboard payload into the File Explorer address bar; explorer.exe directly spawns the hidden shell command with no legitimate GUI file-open lineage.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects instances where an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) that executes a conditional file copy operation. This pattern is characteristic of an adversary creating a webshell by copying a payload to a filename that masquerades as a legitimate web application asset, such as a CSS bundle or validation script.
Detects suspicious execution patterns characteristic of post-exploitation activity, such as invoking 'go run' or 'node' from non-standard directories like AppData or Temp, as well as the use of command-line routines to delete files after execution (often associated with self-deleting secondary payloads or persistence cleanup).
Detects the spawning of common administrative or script-execution tools as child processes from SharePoint-related processes (w3wp.exe or OWSTIMER.EXE). This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts targeting SharePoint application pools to execute arbitrary code.
Detects the spawning of suspicious child processes (powershell, cmd, node, wscript, cscript) by dependency management utilities (npm, go, terraform). Attackers often leverage malicious packages or configurations during the build or install phase to execute arbitrary code. The rule also monitors for suspicious command-line execution patterns, such as detached 'go run' operations, which may indicate malicious activity.
Detects the execution of 'ClickFix' or 'fake-CAPTCHA' patterns where a user is tricked into copying and pasting a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog. The rule specifically identifies the launch of conhost.exe from explorer.exe with --headless arguments, utilizing command-line tools like curl, iex, or irm to fetch and execute external payloads.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware utilizing the process rnpkeys.exe as a parent to spawn common LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) or execute payloads from temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of a secondary stage execution chain typical of the Sauron Loader.
Detects instances where the rnpkeys process (likely used for GPG-related operations) spawns common Windows living-off-the-land binaries such as rundll32, regsvr32, msiexec, cmd, powershell, or wscript. It specifically monitors for patterns indicating potential script execution from temporary folders, the bypass of PowerShell execution policies, or the installation of products via msiexec, which may indicate malicious activity following initial compromise or delivery of a malicious payload.
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