Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
This rule detects potentially malicious process execution chains where VBScript or unknown/suspicious binaries (such as ProfileQuickHost.exe) are used to launch Node.js processes, specifically targeting JavaScript files or VBScript agents. This pattern is often associated with the execution of remote access trojans (RATs) or custom malware loaders.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms by monitoring for the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' name, as well as the execution of suspicious scripts named 'update1.vbs' or 'update1.ps1' by wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe when spawned from explorer.exe.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of WSF scripts from the AppData directory, followed by registry modifications using reg.exe or rundll32.exe. Additionally, it monitors for the creation or presence of specific suspicious files (clspack.exe, filetext.txt, prnfig.wsf) in user profile directories, often indicative of staging or persistence.
Detects potential staging and execution chains involving remote MSI file fetching via msiexec.exe, or the execution of .wsf scripts or registry imports originating from or residing in AppData directories. This behavior is indicative of multistage malware delivery or persistence mechanisms where components are downloaded and executed using LOLBins.
This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious script or executable files (.bat, .ps1, .exe, .vbs) within the Windows Startup folder. It triggers when these files are created by processes typically used for automation or development (dotnet, python) or processes utilizing specific semantic/download-related command lines. The rule further correlates this activity with the presence of PowerShell commands indicative of script downloading or code execution (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) by the same device within the same timeframe, suggesting persistent execution of potentially malicious code.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns cmd.exe or wscript.exe to execute batch files (.bat) or scripts with specific filenames. This behavior is often associated with malicious user activity, such as executing payloads disguised as innocuous files triggered via shell interactions.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious script or executable files (.bat, .ps1, .exe, .vbs) within the Windows Startup folder. It triggers when these files are created by processes typically used for automation or development (dotnet, python) or processes utilizing specific semantic/download-related command lines. The rule further correlates this activity with the presence of PowerShell commands indicative of script downloading or code execution (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) by the same device within the same timeframe, suggesting persistent execution of potentially malicious code.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns cscript.exe with a VBScript file in the command line. This sequence often indicates an attempt to run obfuscated or malicious scripts using built-in Windows scripting engines, which is a common technique for initial access or execution by adversaries.
This rule monitors for two potentially suspicious activities on Windows systems: the creation of scheduled tasks named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' or 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore' using 'schtasks.exe', and the execution of scripts via 'wscript.exe' with silent flags ('//B' and '//Nologo'). These behaviors are often associated with persistence mechanisms or the execution of obfuscated/malicious scripts.
Detects VBScript files that exhibit characteristics of a downloader or dropper, including common Windows API usage (WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream), staging in the C:\Users\Public\ directory, and performing sandbox evasion via WMI InstallDate checks.
This rule detects potential dropper activity associated with the TrustSink/XHOPLESS threat actor, specifically involving an 'Evernote.zip' file staged in the C:\Users\Public directory. It monitors for the automated extraction of files (like a repurposed notepad++.exe) using VBScript's Shell.Application or WScript.Shell, which is indicative of a side-loading attack chain.
Detects the use of WScript or CScript to query the Win32_OperatingSystem WMI class for the InstallDate property. This behavior is commonly used by malware to identify the system installation time, which can serve as a simple heuristic for sandbox evasion or environmental keying.
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