Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
694 detections
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Detects suspicious file creation or execution of Node.js scripts linked to VS Code or .claude directories. This behavior often suggests the presence of poisoned IDE configurations or malicious task automation attempts designed to execute code when a project or IDE folder is opened.
Detects the use of Amazon Q related configuration files (.amazonq, mcp.json) in conjunction with common command-line utilities such as bash, sh, npx, or node. This activity may indicate an attempt to interact with or exploit developer tools and environment configurations to perform unauthorized reconnaissance or execution.
Detects suspicious execution of scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe) that are commonly leveraged by the Gamaredon threat group. The rule specifically flags VBScript/HTA execution originating from temporary directories and monitors for the creation of persistence via Windows Registry Run keys.
Detects node.js executing known malicious npm lifecycle scripts (such as install-check.cjs, verify-peer.cjs, sync-peer.cjs, postinstall-run.js, and preinstall.js) often found in node_modules folders. These scripts are associated with the Polymarket Trap supply chain campaign, which leverages malicious npm hooks for initial access or malicious activity within a development environment.
Detects the execution of Node.js scripts associated with the Polymarket Trap / Trum3it npm supply chain campaign. This rule monitors process launch events for Node.js command lines that include suspicious lifecycle hook scripts (e.g., install-check.cjs, postinstall-run.js) often used by malicious packages to achieve initial code execution on developer machines.
Detects Node.js processes engaging in suspicious behaviors related to supply chain or second-stage attacks. This includes executing scripts from hidden .peer/ directories, accessing specific staging script filenames, and performing DNS requests or network connections to the known malicious domain data-stream.space.
This rule detects suspicious SAP RFC (Remote Function Call) activity, including the execution of OS commands via SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM, usage of custom ZREDTEAM command interfaces, and the presence of scripts or indicators related to SAP credential extraction (e.g., password hash access).
Detects a script interpreter deleting a downloaded HTA, JavaScript, PowerShell, or batch file after persistence has been created. This behavior is often associated with malware like InstallFix to remove initial infection artifacts.
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
A node/python/pip-driven package install resolves a domain that Palo Alto classifies as newly-registered within seconds of the install. This signals a potential malicious dependency or compromised package beaconing to attacker infrastructure (supply-chain compromise / install-time C2).
Detects the 'node' process creating hidden JavaScript or native loader files (e.g., .js, .node, .so, .dylib, .bin) in user profile or temporary directories. This activity is indicative of the OpenClaw malware's staging phase, where it drops its components for persistence or further execution.
Detects HTTP responses containing JavaScript files with a Content-Length exceeding 1MB. This behavior is associated with the Bluekit PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) platform, which uses large, obfuscated JavaScript bundles for browser fingerprinting and to evade static security signatures.
This rule detects suspicious update requests to the Ghost CMS Admin API that indicate an attempt at dynamic script injection. It specifically looks for PUT requests to `/ghost/api/admin/posts/` containing markers associated with Base64 decoding (`atob(`) and dynamic DOM manipulation (`appendChild`, `createElement`), or specific strings (`ghost_once_footer_`, `btoa(a.origin)`) known to be used in the Ghost ClickFix attack chain. This activity suggests an attacker is attempting to inject malicious JavaScript into Ghost CMS content, potentially leveraging a vulnerability like CVE-2026-26980.
Detects suspicious execution chains where common Windows scripting hosts (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, etc.) spawn node.exe to run JavaScript files from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, etc.). The rule flags execution patterns often associated with the TONResolver RAT, including specific PowerShell encoding or cryptography patterns and node.js scripts running from non-standard application paths.
Detects network requests to the BadBlocker (AdBlock for YouTube) infrastructure that fetch malicious scriptlet rules. These rules are designed to leverage Chrome's scripting API to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the 'MAIN' world of web pages, effectively bypassing Content Security Policy (CSP) protections to inject unauthorized content.
This rule detects activities associated with the BeepRAT malware, including the execution of LuaJit.exe with specific command-line arguments (config.ini, temp.bin), the creation of staging files in the TCC local AppData directory, and parent-child process relationships involving a known dropper (HFY.exe). It also utilizes specific SHA256 hashes to identify known malicious BeepRAT binaries.
This rule targets suspicious process launches where an executable, specifically a `.exe` file, is executed from a temporary directory (e.g., `temp` or `appdata\local\temp`). The detection is further refined by looking for a command line pattern where the executable is followed by a numeric argument (1 to 10 digits) and then a long Base64-like string (at least 40 characters long, optionally padded with '=='). This pattern is often observed in malware that uses temporary files and obfuscated command-line parameters for execution.
This rule targets suspicious process launches where an executable, specifically a `.exe` file, is executed from a temporary directory (e.g., `temp` or `appdata\local\temp`). The detection is further refined by looking for a command line pattern where the executable is followed by a numeric argument (1 to 10 digits) and then a long Base64-like string (at least 40 characters long, optionally padded with '=='). This pattern is often observed in malware that uses temporary files and obfuscated command-line parameters for execution.
Detects the execution of Node.js processes initiated by or related to the Flowise low-code AI platform, specifically where the --require flag is used. This pattern may indicate the loading of arbitrary JavaScript code or modules into the Node.js runtime, which could be indicative of malicious code injection or exploit activity within the Flowise environment.
Detects instances where Node.js or Code.exe (e.g., VS Code integrated terminals) spawns child processes executing suspicious JavaScript files or command-line arguments indicative of web-based exploitation or lateral movement, such as 'jsonwebauth', 'lserver.js', or 'errorHandler.js'.
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