Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
694 detections
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Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
Detects the indexed-btree npm malware loader embedded in BTree.prototype.set that spawns a detached hidden Node.js child process and references sharedLoad.min.js
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
Detects potential zero-click administrator session hijacking by correlating a logged-in administrator accessing a page containing user-generated content (e.g., comments) followed immediately by a sensitive administrative action (e.g., plugin installation, user creation) within a 5-second window, suggesting automated script execution via an autofocus/onfocus handler triggered by the admin's browser.
Detects the execution of JavaScript files using wscript.exe from user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) that exhibit high levels of obfuscation. The rule specifically flags scripts containing a high ratio of comment lines to code, a technique often used in the LausivLoader malware family to mask malicious payloads constructed using String.fromCharCode.
This rule detects the LausivLoader initial-stage obfuscated JavaScript dropper. It identifies the malware either by specific file hashes (MD5/SHA256) or by detecting characteristic behaviors: small file size (<1MB), the presence of 'String.fromCharCode' obfuscation techniques, excessive junk comments, and supply-chain related lure strings.
Detects BeaverTail JavaScript-based loader malware hidden inside NPM packages, distributed via GitHub or Bitbucket during fake technical interviews
Detects network activity associated with the JWR Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This includes the retrieval of the client-side JavaScript engine (main.js) from lookalike domains related to courier or government services, and subsequent client-side detection of the 'window.__HOST_MODE' flag, which indicates the browser has been primed for a specific phishing scenario.
Detects attempts to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on a MongoDB server using the deprecated eval command or patterns consistent with sandbox escape techniques (probing for process, load, and require functions).
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage malware loader, specifically targeting npm-based JavaScript files. The rule identifies malicious activity through specific artifacts including hardcoded C2 URLs (vercel.app domains), campaign markers, file paths, and eval-based execution patterns.
Detects the obfuscated index.js payload bundled in the compromised actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment commit a0c53dd42fc842d2f9276c5a1d4f9a26abe8713d, executed via 'bun run $GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/index.js'
Detects the obfuscated index.js payload bundled in the compromised actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment commit a0c53dd42fc842d2f9276c5a1d4f9a26abe8713d, executed via 'bun run $GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/index.js'
Detects the obfuscated index.js payload bundled in the compromised actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment commit a0c53dd42fc842d2f9276c5a1d4f9a26abe8713d, executed via 'bun run $GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/index.js'
Detects the obfuscated index.js payload bundled in the compromised actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment commit a0c53dd42fc842d2f9276c5a1d4f9a26abe8713d, executed via 'bun run $GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/index.js'
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached, hidden child node.exe process from within a node_modules directory, a technique observed in the indexed-btree npm supply-chain malware to establish a stealthy runtime loader.
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
This rule monitors for suspicious Node.js process activity, specifically focusing on the loading of scripts associated with obfuscated or malicious packages (e.g., sharedLoad.min.js, indexed-btree) and the use of child_process spawn patterns that indicate detached, hidden, or unreferenced child processes, which are common tactics for bypassing detection or maintaining stealthy execution.
Detects the Kimsuky APT-C-55 'Stella_Gary' attack chain, where PowerShell is used to download a JavaScript verification script from an external C2 (InfinityFree), followed by the execution of that script via cscript.exe in temporary directories. This behavior is used to bypass anti-bot mechanisms and retrieve secondary payloads from hardcoded C2 infrastructure.
Detects the obfuscated first-stage JavaScript payload sharedLoad.min.js dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, identified by string-array encoding and self-checksumming array rotation obfuscation patterns
Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
Detects the indexed-btree npm malware loader embedded in BTree.prototype.set that spawns a detached hidden Node.js child process and references sharedLoad.min.js
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