Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
81 detections
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Detects the execution of common system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, nltest, etc.) used to perform environment discovery or credential enumeration, specifically when targeting Domain Controllers, Active Directory objects, database credentials, or sensitive configuration files.
Detects network-based enumeration of Active Directory components, including user accounts, computer objects, group memberships, session information, and domain trust relationships. This pattern is characteristic of automated discovery tools used during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
Detects anomalous discovery behavior in Azure where a principal performs multiple 'read' operations against both Container Registry and Role Assignments within a short timeframe. This pattern is consistent with an adversary attempting to map the cloud environment, identify accessible resources, and understand permission structures.
Detects the execution of the SharpShares tool, which is commonly used by adversaries to enumerate network shares across a domain or local network for reconnaissance purposes.
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
This rule monitors for processes dynamically resolving sensitive Windows networking API functions (WNetAddConnection2, NetShareEnum, NetUserEnum) at runtime using GetProcAddress. This technique is often used by malware to conceal its reliance on legitimate system APIs to perform discovery operations, such as enumerating network shares or users, while evading static analysis.
Detects BloodHound Active Directory enumeration tool activity
Detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to perform enumeration of local administrators or domain-level users and groups. This behavior is commonly associated with attackers attempting to map out the environment for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects the execution of common enumeration commands (net, dsquery) on systems identified as Domain Controllers. These commands are frequently used by adversaries for reconnaissance to identify local or domain users and groups after gaining access to a host.
Detects bulk enumeration of Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, devices, service principals) characteristic of tools like AzureHound or roadtx. The detection focuses on high-frequency GET requests originating from known Edge browser client IDs associated with CA policy bypass (CVE-2025-0309) where tokens lack MFA claims, indicating unauthorized reconnaissance in an Azure/Entra ID environment.
This rule detects the execution of common enumeration commands (net, dsquery) on systems identified as Domain Controllers. These commands are frequently used by adversaries for reconnaissance to identify local or domain users and groups after gaining access to a host.
Process Spawns Multiple Recon Processes
Cortex XDR
Detects anomalous host reconnaissance patterns characterized by the execution of four or more distinct discovery tools (e.g., systeminfo, ipconfig, net, whoami) by a single process within a 24-hour period. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing environment discovery following initial access or privilege escalation. This will not catch discovery commands that are run in "memory", only those that spawn an additional executable like whoami.
Detects the execution of known StrikeShark post-compromise reconnaissance tools, specifically fscan.exe and searchall.exe, as well as associated administrative commands used for domain group and trust discovery in Windows environments.
Correlates a successful Fortinet SSL VPN session with nltest, net, Get-AD*, AdFind, ldapsearch, WinRS, or WMIC discovery commands for the same account within forty-five minutes. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing initial access via VPN and then performing internal reconnaissance.
Detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to perform enumeration of local administrators or domain-level users and groups. This behavior is commonly associated with attackers attempting to map out the environment for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Lateral Movement via VPN
Cortex XDR
This rule detects post-VPN activity indicative of discovery or lateral movement targeting directory services. It specifically looks for commands associated with LDAP, Kerberos, SMB, or WinRM activity to multiple internal systems, often seen after an initial VPN compromise. The rule focuses on processes like PowerShell, cmd, net, nltest, adfind, ldapsearch, wmic, and winrs executing commands related to network enumeration and directory service interaction.
Detects the execution or presence of distinct, custom red-teaming utilities and EDR evasion tools favored by The Gentlemen threat actors. This rule identifies specific filenames and command-line arguments associated with these tools.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate permission group memberships remotely over the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, specifically targeting port 445. The detection is based on the presence of the case-insensitive string "NetGroupEnum" within the TCP payload, indicating a network scan or reconnaissance activity aimed at discovering group information.
Detects enumeration of group memberships for permission group discovery
This query detects activity associated with the BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend toolset used in post‑exploitation campaigns (including "Nightmare Eclipse" intrusions). It identifies:
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
This query detects activity associated with the BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend toolset used in post‑exploitation campaigns (including "Nightmare Eclipse" intrusions). It identifies:
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
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