Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
31 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
9
9
3
3
2
Contributors
7
6
6
4
2
Categories
21
16
15
11
10
Platforms
29
3
3
1
1
Products / Services
14
12
3
2
2
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
CVEs
1
IDS Classtypes
2
IDS Protocols
2
This rule detects activities associated with the SSHStalker botnet. It identifies outbound IRC-like network traffic on common IRC ports (6667, 6697, 7000) over TCP. It also looks for persistence mechanisms by monitoring writes to common cron job directories and files on Linux systems. Additionally, the rule detects log tampering attempts by monitoring writes to critical system log files such as /var/run/utmp, /var/log/wtmp, and /var/log/lastlog. Finally, it identifies on-host compilation activities, specifically the execution of compilers (gcc, cc, clang) or build tools (make) within suspicious temporary directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm, which can indicate malware compilation.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the SSHStalker botnet on Linux systems, including outbound IRC-like network connections, modifications to cron files for persistence, log tampering (specifically utmp/wtmp/lastlog files), and the execution of compilers from suspicious directories like /tmp or /dev/shm. Each section of the rule targets a specific behavior of the botnet.
The following rule detects attempts to tamper with Linux log records by looking for interpreter processes, or common utility commands interacting with critical log files such as /var/log/wtmp, /var/log/btmp, or /var/run/utmp. It also includes scenarios where 'dd' or 'cp' might be used with /dev/null or /dev/zero to effectively clear or overwrite log content.
Detects adversaries directly manipulating Linux login files to remove evidence of unauthorized access. These binary files record successful logins (wtmp), current sessions (utmp), and failed attempts (btmp).
Sophisticated attackers target these files because they're primary forensic artifacts for login tracking. Unlike clearing logs with rm (which deletes the file), this technique involves editing to remove specific entries while leaving the file structure intact.
Common manipulation methods include: utmp-specific cleaners, and overwriting entries with null bytes,
Sophisticated attackers target these files because they're primary forensic artifacts for login tracking. Unlike clearing logs with rm (which deletes the file), this technique involves editing to remove specific entries while leaving the file structure intact.
Common manipulation methods include: utmp-specific cleaners, and overwriting entries with null bytes,
Detects adversaries directly manipulating Linux login files to remove evidence of unauthorized access. These binary files record successful logins (wtmp), current sessions (utmp), and failed attempts (btmp).
This rule looks for the use of common interpeters in the context of editing binary login files.
Sophisticated attackers target these files because they're primary forensic artifacts for login tracking.
This rule looks for the use of common interpeters in the context of editing binary login files.
Sophisticated attackers target these files because they're primary forensic artifacts for login tracking.
Detects logs cleared in MacOS systems
Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog, a technique often used by attackers to hide their tracks. This rule identifies the use of utilities like 'rm', 'unlink', 'mv', 'truncate', 'ln', 'cp', 'shred', and 'journalctl' when their command lines target '/var/log/syslog' or perform actions that would clear syslog content.
Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action codes 4, 5, or 6, which can clear or disable the kernel ring buffer (dmesg logs). This technique can be used by attackers to hide traces after exploitation or privilege escalation. A common method is running `dmesg -c`, which internally triggers this syscall.
Clear Linux Logs
Sigma
Detects attempts to clear logs on the system by identifying command-line executions of 'rm', 'shred', or 'unlink' targeting common log directories like '/var/log' and '/var/spool/mail'. Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion.
Detects attempts to clear macOS system logs by identifying common commands used for file deletion ('rm', 'unlink', 'shred') when targeting known log directories such as '/var/log' or user-specific '/Users/*/Library/Logs/'. This activity is often performed by adversaries to remove evidence of their presence and actions on a compromised system.
Page 2 of 2