Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
461 detections
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This rule detects outbound network connections directed at a known IP address associated with Akira ransomware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with 64.227.4.134, which has been identified as a C2 node utilizing GOST tunnels. This behavior is indicative of established C2 connectivity by Akira ransomware actors.
Detects evidence of the SLAPSHOT backdoor on Citrix NetScaler appliances by identifying specific ephemeral IPC files (/tmp/.uxdport and /tmp/.uxdlock) or the associated python-based launcher process that uses base64-encoded arguments to initialize the proxy daemon.
Detects modifications to Azure DevOps pipelines or service connections that include indicators of outbound tunneling or reverse proxy tools (e.g., ngrok, socat, chisel, or SSH reverse tunnels). This behavior is characteristic of an attacker attempting to establish a command-and-control channel or bypass firewall restrictions by tunneling traffic out of the CI/CD pipeline execution environment.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
This rule detects outbound network connections directed at a known IP address associated with Akira ransomware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with 64.227.4.134, which has been identified as a C2 node utilizing GOST tunnels. This behavior is indicative of established C2 connectivity by Akira ransomware actors.
This rule monitors network connections initiated by common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe) to known domains associated with a specific VPN proxy service or subscription-based proxy farm infrastructure. The rule flags endpoints communicating with URLs involved in proxy beaconing, fallback hosting, and subscription API calls.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
Detects successful Entra ID authentication events where the user login originated from an anonymized or malicious IP address, or exhibited unfamiliar features, despite successfully completing multi-factor authentication (MFA). This pattern is consistent with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks, where a proxy service is used to intercept and bypass MFA controls.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects automated HTTP GET requests directed at government or council calendar endpoints (specifically targeting mgCalendarMonthView or GetMeetings parameters) using a common generic User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of an automated scripted client potentially using public infrastructure as a Command and Control (C2) relay.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where multiple distinct user identities authenticate from the same source IP (often a VPN or proxy) within a short timeframe, characteristic of North Korean IT worker laptop-farm or identity-mule operations where a single operator manages multiple contractor accounts.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects specific HTTP traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware's FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) reverse-tunneling deployment and C2 status reporting. The rule identifies the sequence of fetching configuration, initiating WebSocket tunnel links, and reporting deployment status to a remote command-and-control server.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to connect to known infrastructure associated with the VPN-for-X extension, which has been observed acting as a fallback proxy. The rule alerts on specific TLS SNI strings (de8.staticvaultcdn.org, de4.servefaststatic.work, de34.rapidstaticserve.cc) commonly leveraged by this infrastructure.
Detects network traffic associated with the RatHat Android RAT, specifically monitoring for HTTP and TLS connections to the command and control (C2) delivery domain 'kingbss.com', as well as detecting characteristic FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) client login handshake patterns used for tunnel establishment.
Detects the execution of known tunneling binaries (ngrok, cloudflared) or network connections to tunneling service domains (ngrok.io, ngrok-free.app, trycloudflare.com), which are frequently used to establish unauthorized remote access or bypass perimeter security controls.
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