Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
461 detections
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Detects anomalous authentication patterns where multiple distinct user identities authenticate from the same source IP (often a VPN or proxy) within a short timeframe, characteristic of North Korean IT worker laptop-farm or identity-mule operations where a single operator manages multiple contractor accounts.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
This rule monitors network connections initiated by common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe) to known domains associated with a specific VPN proxy service or subscription-based proxy farm infrastructure. The rule flags endpoints communicating with URLs involved in proxy beaconing, fallback hosting, and subscription API calls.
Detects network traffic attempting to connect to common public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9) via TLS SNI or HTTP headers. This activity is often associated with malware or malicious agents attempting to bypass traditional DNS monitoring for command and control (C2) communication.
Detects the presence of known RatHat Go-based command agents (liblocal-service.so) or frpc reverse-proxy clients (libmedia_codec.so) when staged within temporary directories such as /data/local/tmp on Android devices, often following manual ADB shell interaction.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects network activity associated with the 'VPN-for-X' browser extension, specifically targeting communication with external services used for proxy configuration fetching and dead-drop proxy list retrieval. This includes TLS SNI checks for GitHub, Blogspot, and Telegram, as well as specific URI requests for proxy configurations and server lists.
Detects HTTP CONNECT requests to external networks that include Proxy-Authorization headers with Basic authentication. This pattern is indicative of malicious proxy tunneling or unauthorized credential usage for bypassing security controls or establishing command and control channels via a proxy.
Detects network connection events initiated by known beaconing-related process names. These processes are associated with command and control infrastructure or pivot nodes often used by adversaries for post-compromise activity.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
Detects the use of nodejs.exe to initiate external network tunnels to known tunneling services like pinggy.io or generic tunnels using common tunnel configuration flags.
This rule detects the execution of the Xray proxy utility (xray-core) when launched by the RemoteApp workspace broker process (wkspbroker.exe) or located within the RemoteApp Gateway application data folder. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using proxy tools to facilitate command-and-control communication or network traffic tunneling via trusted remote access infrastructure.
Detects network traffic exhibiting beaconing patterns to 'dl.google.com' that may be indicative of Xray-core C2 tunneling disguised as legitimate Google traffic. The rule uses a threshold to identify consistent connection attempts.
This rule identifies network connections or event logs originating from known residential and anonymous proxy providers, including Nodemaven, DataImpulse, Luminati (Bright Data), ProxyRack, Shifter, SOAX, and Yilu. Adversaries frequently use these proxy services to mask their true origin, evade IP-based geolocation blocks, and conduct malicious activity while blending in with legitimate traffic.
Detects a specific network handshake pattern characterized by the string 'REVERSE_PROXY|' within the first 16 bytes of an established TCP connection, consistent with the x47.c Fast-Flux botnet command and control (C2) communication protocol.
Detects network traffic consistent with the x47.c bot performing a SOCKS5 reverse-proxy handshake to a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule triggers on the specific 'REVERSE_PROXY|' string signature within established outbound TCP connections.
Detects network activity associated with RatHat FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy), including configuration fetching, deployment notifications, and command-and-control handshakes. These rules monitor for specific HTTP API endpoints and TCP patterns used by the tool to establish unauthorized reverse tunnels.
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