Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
107 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
47
23
21
7
3
Contributors
20
20
19
13
6
Categories
55
45
28
20
13
Platforms
54
35
22
6
2
Products / Services
48
47
22
15
5
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,585
8,395
6,225
IDS Classtypes
20
13
8
6
IDS Protocols
29
15
1
This KQL detects activity associated with network traffic to known C2 infrastructure (45.146.252.17), suspicious Node/NPM execution chains and dropped payload/marker files. Also looks for indicators of remote control, clipboard access, screenshot/desktop-control packages, Socket.IO C2 traffic, and file/browser/wallet data exfiltration behavior.
Detects outbound network traffic containing the specific string 'Secret: ' using raw TCP, often indicative of data exfiltration or unauthorized command-and-control communication via tunneling tools like netcat or ngrok.
Detects execution of gsocket-related tools (gs-netcat, gsocket, gs-sftp) or command-line patterns typically used for remote shell access or socket redirection, such as using -e with a shell, -l/-p for listening, or redirecting I/O from common temporary directories.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (Type 8) directed towards external networks that contain a payload size greater than 128 bytes. Such anomalies are often indicative of ICMP tunneling, which may be leveraged by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (type 8, code 0) that contain payloads exceeding 64 bytes. ICMP Echo requests with large, non-standard payloads are a classic indicator of ICMP tunneling, which can be used to bypass network firewalls and encapsulate non-ICMP traffic for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple such packets are seen from the same source.
Detects outbound ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets that contain an abnormally large payload (greater than 64 bytes). This behavior is characteristic of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within the payload of ICMP packets to bypass network security controls or establish covert command and control communication.
Detects anomalous ICMP traffic patterns, specifically ICMP Echo Request packets with unusually large payload sizes (dsize > 64) and specific byte signatures consistent with known ICMP tunneling tools such as icmpsh or ptunnel, which are used to establish covert C2 channels.
This rule detects ICMP Echo Request (type 8) packets with an unusually large payload (greater than 64 bytes). Such anomalies often indicate that an adversary is using ICMP as a covert channel for command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, by embedding arbitrary data within the ICMP payload fields.
Detects high-frequency ICMP Echo Requests (Type 8) directed from internal networks to external destinations with oversized payloads (greater than 200 bytes). This pattern is indicative of ICMP tunneling, which is often used by adversaries for covert command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, bypassing standard filtering or monitoring.
Detects high-frequency ICMP Echo Requests (Type 8) directed from internal networks to external destinations with oversized payloads (greater than 200 bytes). This pattern is indicative of ICMP tunneling, which is often used by adversaries for covert command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, bypassing standard filtering or monitoring.
Detects anomalous ICMP traffic patterns, specifically ICMP Echo Request packets with unusually large payload sizes (dsize > 64) and specific byte signatures consistent with known ICMP tunneling tools such as icmpsh or ptunnel, which are used to establish covert C2 channels.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (Type 8) directed towards external networks that contain a payload size greater than 128 bytes. Such anomalies are often indicative of ICMP tunneling, which may be leveraged by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (type 8, code 0) that contain payloads exceeding 64 bytes. ICMP Echo requests with large, non-standard payloads are a classic indicator of ICMP tunneling, which can be used to bypass network firewalls and encapsulate non-ICMP traffic for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple such packets are seen from the same source.
This rule detects ICMP Echo Request (type 8) packets with an unusually large payload (greater than 64 bytes). Such anomalies often indicate that an adversary is using ICMP as a covert channel for command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, by embedding arbitrary data within the ICMP payload fields.
Detects ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets with a payload size exceeding 1000 bytes. This is a common indicator of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within ICMP packets to bypass network security controls for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets with a payload size exceeding 1000 bytes. This is a common indicator of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within ICMP packets to bypass network security controls for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network connections to port 8084 initiated by processes originating from suspicious directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of VSHELL RAT leveraging WebSocket-based C2 communication, a technique observed in UNC5221 SNOWLIGHT campaigns.
Detects BPFDoor-style iptables NAT REDIRECT rules used to tunnel traffic from a
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a
bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a
bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
Linux BPFDoor iptables Redirect
Gravwell
Detects BPFDoor-style iptables NAT REDIRECT rules used to tunnel traffic from a
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
Detects anomalous outbound TCP network connections on port 8084 originating from non-browser processes to known CDN providers (Akamai, Microsoft). This behavior is characteristic of VSHELL RAT C2 beaconing using domain blending techniques to mask communications within expected network noise.
Detects outbound SOCKS5 negotiation patterns commonly used by the Salt Typhoon threat group's STOWAWAY tool. The rule triggers on TCP traffic initiating a SOCKS5 handshake (represented by the sequence |05 01 00|) to non-standard ports, excluding common proxy ports (1080, 3128, 8080, 8443, 9050). This behavior is indicative of a multi-hop SOCKS5 relay or command-and-control connection.
Page 3 of 6