Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
839 detections
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Detects a successful Key Vault access policy or role change that grants secret-reading capability to a user or service principal. This could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in Azure Key Vault.
Detects successful retrieval of storage account access keys by a user identity rather than an established deployment or backup service. This activity can indicate an attacker attempting to gain access to sensitive data stored in Azure Storage Accounts.
Detects credential abuse patterns from FortiGate logs including administrative changes, tunneling activity, and anomalous source-IP behavior.
Detects the use of 'net.exe' to create or modify user accounts, specifically looking for commands that include 'user', 'admin', and '/add'. This could indicate an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating new administrative accounts.
This rule monitors Cisco SD-WAN logs (vManage, auth, and syslog) for suspicious administrative activity including credential manipulation, unauthorized password changes, successful vManage-admin SSH logins, and potential configuration exfiltration via vManage API calls.
Detects the modification of sensitive banking or payment election records (e.g., direct deposit details) in Workday or similar HR SaaS platforms shortly after a user login event from the same source IP. This behavior is consistent with 'Payroll Pirate' style attacks where adversaries use stolen session tokens (via AiTM phishing) to redirect employee salary payments.
Detects modifications to Active Directory user accounts by monitoring Security Event ID 4738. The rule filters out service accounts (those ending with '$') and ensures the target username is populated.
Detects modifications to Active Directory user accounts by monitoring Security Event ID 4738. The rule filters out service accounts (those ending with '$') and ensures the target username is populated.
Detects changes to the attributes of the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory. The AdminSDHolder object is a template used by the Active Directory security descriptor propagator (SDProp) to enforce permissions on protected administrative groups. Modification of this object is a highly suspicious activity that can be used to establish persistence or grant excessive privileges by poisoning the security descriptors of all protected objects within the domain.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of the `authorized_keys` file within the `.ssh` directory by processes other than common SSH key management or shell utilities. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or elevate privileges by adding their own public key for SSH access.
Detects unauthorized privilege escalation attempts within the MyBB Admin Control Panel (ACP) by monitoring limited-privilege accounts accessing restricted modules (e.g., plugins, templates, user groups). It correlates these web requests with file system changes in the plugin directory by the web server process and monitors application logs for suspicious administrative activity.
Detects Key Vault access policy or role changes that grant secret-reading capabilities.
Detects removal of registered authentication methods shortly after a password reset, a sequence that can prevent the legitimate user from recovering the account. This rule specifically looks for successful 'Delete user authentication method' or 'Remove authentication method' operations in AuditLogs.
This rule detects anomalous access to cloud services, specifically Salesforce, Drift, Salesloft, HubSpot, and Marketo, that may indicate OAuth token abuse. It identifies scenarios where a high volume of actions (8 or more) occur within a short timeframe (3 hours or less) from a single IP address but with multiple unique user agents (2 or more). The detection is further refined by looking for actions related to 'Add delegated permission grant' or 'Create service principal', which are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges after gaining access through a compromised OAuth token.
Detects an SSPR (Self-Service Password Reset) event immediately followed by the registration of a new Microsoft Authenticator method for the same user. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker has compromised an identity, performed a password reset, and is attempting to establish a new MFA method for persistent access.
This rule detects the creation of Okta API tokens with broad administrative scopes (okta.users.manage, okta.factors.manage, or okta.apps.manage) by the same user multiple times within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an attempt to establish persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Identifies the threat actor modifying Azure AD Cross-Tenant Access Policies to allow B2B collaboration with external attacker-controlled tenants.
Detects device registration attempts mapping a refresh token to the Device Registration Service (ms-drs) for persistence. This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain access or bypass conditional access policies by registering a new device.
Detects when a guest user (identified by '#EXT#' in their UPN) is assigned a sensitive role like 'Agent ID Administrator' or 'AgentAdministrator' in Entra ID. It also detects when any user, including guest users, performs modifications related to 'Agent' blueprints. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or unauthorized administrative actions by external users within an Azure Active Directory environment.
Detects deployment of the VMAccess extension via Azure Management plane, which can be abused by attackers to create local backdoor administrators on Azure Virtual Machines.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the creation or update of managed identities and the assignment of highly privileged roles (Contributor, Owner, User Access Administrator) to them. It specifically looks for multiple such assignments within a one-hour window to managed identities associated with automation, runbook, or function resources, indicating potential privilege escalation or malicious access.
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